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THREE ESSAYS EVALUATING CHOICES OF TEACHERS AND 
ADMINISTRATORS IN KENTUCKY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
 
 
 
Public K-12 education is a large enterprise in the United States.  Through local, state and 
federal sources, the U.S. allocated over $610 billion to K-12 public education in 2009 
(NCES).  Not only is the commitment of public funds for education substantial, the 
provision of K-12 education is primarily administered by the government in non-market 
settings through local school districts.  It is this institutional environment that generates 
the impetus for evaluating how those in education make choices in the absence of 
markets. 
 
Like traditional markets, non-market solutions often fail because the incentives facing 
individuals and agencies elicit choices which produce outcomes that are divergent from 
those which could be considered Pareto optimal.  Examining these incentives and the 
resulting choices allows researchers to identify unintended consequences of policy and 
better inform policy design and reform.  This dissertation endeavors to identify some of 
these incentives and to empirically examine their effects on the choices made by 
teachers and administrators. 
 
Chapter two recognizes that teaching effectiveness may motivate teacher choice into 
relatively more rigorous professional development.  The empirical results suggest that 
teachers with a past history of relative ineffectiveness are selecting into the professional 
development program examined.  The subsequent effectiveness of the in-service training 
is mixed. 
 
High stakes testing and school accountability are an increasing part of our K-12 
education system.  Chapter three acknowledges it is plausible that administrators may 
choose to place more students into class rooms of more effective teachers to maximize 
school performance.  However, because of tenure and salary constraints they may 
choose to place fewer students into the class rooms of more effective teachers to reward 
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their performance.  Results overall indicate that more effective teachers have larger 
classes.    
                  
Chapter four examines school district budget uncertainty and its relation to contingency 
funds.  The institutional ambiguity of the definition of contingency funds allows a 
significant amount of choice for administrators to determine fund size and use.  This 
chapter finds that administrators may be less sensitive to budget uncertainty and more 
responsive to the desire for budget fungibility.  This dissertation concludes by 
addressing implications and future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
An Alternative Context of Choice in Public Education     
 Public K-12 education is one of the largest enterprises in the United States.  
According to the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), through local, state 
and federal sources, the U.S. allocated over $610 billion to K-12 public education in 
2009.  Not only is the commitment of public funds for education substantial, the U.S. 
education system is structured such that the provision of K-12 education is primarily 
administered by the government through local school districts.       
 Conceptually, the argument for funding and/or provision of services by the 
government arises because of inefficiencies in the private sector due to market failures. 
These inefficiencies generally fall into the categories of externalities and public goods.  
However, it is not readily apparent in the context of education that these market failures 
exist in a manner that requires government production of schooling.1  Furthermore, one 
must consider that even if these market failures exist, government production generates 
its own set of inefficiencies.  The argument for government production of any good, 
including education, requires an explicit comparison of the inefficiencies under both 
private market and government conditions.   
 In addressing these potential non-market failures, a substantial academic 
literature has emerged which focuses on market based solutions that introduce school 
                                                          
1 For discussion and analysis of K-12 externalities and education as a public good see 
West (1967), Labaree (1997) and Stoddard (2009).  While there is some evidence of K-
12 education providing positive externalities there is little which would suggest that K-
12 education is a public good by the strict definition of the term.    
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choice for consumers.2  This is the traditional context of choice in K-12 literature.  With 
the introduction of choice, principally through charter schools and voucher systems, 
advocates for market solutions argue that competition arises in the provision of 
education.  By creating market oriented solutions, these reforms are viewed as a means 
to limit inefficiencies attributable to the government.  While this research is valuable, it 
has yet to offer definitive conclusions that school choice arising from these market based 
reforms provides improved educational outcomes.  Moreover, these reforms are not 
without their own unintended consequences, and there is reason to suspect that large 
scale implementation of these initiatives present their own challenges.3  However, it is 
clear that evaluating the effects of those choices is an important academic endeavor.  
 Rather than evaluate choice in market based educational reforms, this 
dissertation builds upon the recognition that education is publically funded and provided 
and is a significant enterprise.4  It is this institutional environment that generates the 
impetus for evaluating how those in education make choices in the absence of markets. 
 Like traditional markets, non-market solutions often fail because the incentives 
facing individuals and agencies elicit choices which produce outcomes that are divergent 
from those which could be considered Pareto optimal.  Examining these incentives and 
the resulting choices allows researchers to identify unintended consequences of policy in 
implementation and better inform policy design and reform.  There are many 
                                                          
2 While the direct consumption of educational outputs is by the students, choice in this 
context is primarily made by parents. 
3 Lubienski (2005) provides an analysis of unintended consequences of market-based 
reforms.  See Ladd (2002) and Barrera-Osorio et al. (2008) for a discussion of issues of 
large scale implementation. 
4 According to NCES, approximately 97% of all K-12 students enrolled in the public 
school system attend a traditional public school. 
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institutional elements of the K-12 school system that introduce a variety of incentives 
for public school teachers and administrators in the provision of educational outputs.  
Often, these institutional procedures create conflicting incentives so that their expected 
effect on the choices made by teachers and administrators is not apparent.  By 
addressing select institutional policies and practices, the dissertation endeavors to 
identify some of these incentives and to empirically examine their effects on the choices 
made by teachers and administrators.     
Organization of the Dissertation 
   Following this introduction, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 address various institutional 
policies and practices, the incentives they create, and analyses of the resulting choices of 
teachers and administrators in Kentucky public schools.  Chapter 2 evaluates the effect 
of professional development activities associated with the Appalachian Math and 
Science Partnership (AMSP) on student achievement.  In doing so, this chapter 
addresses the institutional requirement of professional development and its relation to 
teaching effectiveness.  It examines whether teaching effectiveness serves as an 
incentive in the choice to participate, as part of the professional development 
requirement, in the professional development activities of AMSP. A teacher fixed 
effects model is estimated to generate effectiveness measures.  Results indicate that less 
effective teachers are more likely to participate in the professional development.  Then, 
controlling for the bias of teaching effectiveness on the decision to participate, a 
propensity score matching model is used to create a treatment and non-treatment group 
to determine the effectiveness of the professional development treatment.  The results 
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suggest that the program had a positive and statistically significant effect on student 
achievement in the 5th and 11th grades.      
 Chapter 3 evaluates the relationship between demonstrated teaching 
effectiveness and class size under the institutional constraints of tenure, salary 
schedules, and school accountability.  More specifically, do these constraints provide 
incentives for administrators to compensate or exploit demonstrated teaching 
effectiveness through adjustments in class size?  Using both pooled-OLS and fixed 
effects modeling, this chapter addresses the question of whether administrators choose to 
reward past teaching effectiveness with smaller classes because of tenure and salary 
constraints, or choose to give effective teachers larger classes in an effort to maximize 
school achievement and satisfy school accountability demands.  Results suggest that the 
latter provides a greater incentive for administrator choice as teachers with higher 
demonstrated effectiveness have larger classes.  
 Chapter 4 examines the relationship between school district contingency funds 
and the various factors that may influence their size and use.  Institutional policy 
requires districts to maintain a minimum contingency fund level of 2% of operating 
expenses and there are no institutional restrictions on the size or use of these funds.  
However, the contingency fund is not defined in the traditional accounting sense, as the 
state defines the contingency fund broadly so that it is an amalgam of what is considered 
a traditional contingency fund and accumulated savings.  Therefore, the incentives 
facing the administrator are a function of not only those factors which would affect 
contingency funds but also those factors which determine accumulated savings.  More 
specifically, this chapter assumes the administrator faces incentives traditionally 
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associated with determining contingency fund size and use such as revenue and 
expenditure variability.  However, this chapter also suggests that the administrator seeks 
to create budget fungibility through savings and that this incentive is constrained by 
various political economy factors.  School district contingency funds are estimated using 
both fixed and between effects models to estimate the levels and changes of the 
contingency funds respectively.  This chapter addresses those factors which establish the 
context of choice for the administrator in determining contingency fund size and use and 
in doing so seeks to answer if administrators respond to budget variability and/or the 
incentive to create budget fungibility.  Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation and 
includes a review of the findings, conclusions, limitations, implications, and 
recommendations for future research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Nathan Barrett 2011 
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CHAPTER 2 
DO LESS EFFECTIVE TEACHERS CHOOSE PROFESSIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT: DOES IT MATTER? 
Introduction 
 Academics and policymakers increasingly emphasize that a key to improving 
educational outcomes in the United States lies in enhancing the quality of teachers.  
After many years of research that failed to show significant and systematic effects of 
school level inputs such as per pupil expenditures, teacher salaries, or pupil-teacher 
ratios on student outcomes, recent work illustrates that the quality of teachers is a 
significant factor in explaining student achievement (Boyd, D., Grossman, P., Lankford, 
H., Loeb, S., and Wyckoff, J., 2005a; Clotfelter, C., Ladd, H., and J. Vigdor, 2007; 
Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain, 2005).  For those individuals already in the teaching world, 
one of the hallmarks of this new focus on teacher quality is professional development 
programs.  While different methods of recruitment and training of teachers may affect 
the quality of future teachers, professional development programs focus on changing the 
quality of those teachers currently in the classroom.5  
 Unlike the growing literature on the relationship between pre-service training 
and student achievement (Acevedo, 2009; Aaronson, et. al., 2007; Betts et. al., 2003; 
Clotfelter et.al. 2006, 2007;  Kane et.al. 2006), the effectiveness of professional 
development in influencing in-service teacher quality has received less attention.  Some 
                                                          
5 National Board Certification for in-service teachers is also an alternative route for 
enhancing teacher quality.  See Goldhaber and Anthony (2007) for a description of the 
program and its effects on teacher quality. 
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work has examined teacher perceptions of their own learning from professional 
development activities (Garet, et. al., 2001), but Jacob and Lefgren (2004), Garet et.al 
(2008), and Harris and Sass (2009) are among the few who have empirically examined 
whether and/or to what extent professional development activities influence teacher 
quality exhibited through student learning.  And, of importance for this study, I am 
unaware of any studies of in-service training of teachers concentrated in poor, rural areas 
of the U.S. 
 This paper looks at one program within the Math and Science Partnerships 
(MSPs), a large federally funded initiative that sponsors professional development in the 
K-12 science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) areas focused in Appalachian 
Kentucky.  The program design resembles many real-world policy interventions in that 
it was explicitly not designed for random implementation.  Instead, school districts 
endorsed the program and teachers within a particular region of a state voluntarily chose 
to participate in the program.   For the purposes of this paper, I am ultimately interested 
in two questions.  Did the weakest teachers (i.e., those who have the greatest potential 
for gain from content-based professional development) choose to participate in the MSP 
professional development? The alternative possibilities are that teachers randomly 
selected into professional development, or the highest quality teachers chose the content-
based professional development.   Second, did the professional development add to a 
teacher’s effectiveness?  To answer these questions, I look at teacher effectiveness prior 
to the in-service training, and then link the teacher effectiveness to the propensity to 
participate in the program.   Finally, I measure the program effectiveness.  The results 
indicate that weak teachers from poor performing schools were more likely to participate 
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in the training.  Elementary and high school students showed higher achievement gains 
linked to the teacher training than did middle school students. 
The Appalachian Math and Science Partnership:  A Description  
As part of the vision of the No Child Left Behind Act, the National Science 
Foundation launched a new initiative in 2002 to improve the quality of teaching in the 
STEM areas.  The initiative, as envisioned at the National Science Foundation, was 
focused on the creation of partnerships between institutions of higher education and K-
12 schools to increase the quality of K-12 STEM teachers.   The National Science 
Foundation has allocated approximately $800 million to the new initiative since 2002 
and the programs are now operating in at least 39 states.6  The focus on teacher training 
has as its ultimate goal the improvement in student outcomes in the STEM subject areas. 
Evaluation of the success of the MSPs has varied.  There have been qualitative 
studies that examine whether the partnership between an institution(s) of higher 
education and a particular K-12 school changed teacher or student attitudes or the 
culture of the school.  Alternatively, instruments have been developed to assess whether 
teachers’ knowledge of the content of their STEM area increased after participation in a 
training program.  To date, there has been little disaggregated large scale empirical 
                                                          
6 James Hamos, National Science Foundation, Plenary Talk for the Appalachian Math 
and Science Conference, “Voices of AMSP,” Lexington, KY: December, 2010.  The 
U.S. Department of Education also sponsors programs to foster STEM  professional 
development among teachers. 
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examination of whether focused STEM teacher professional development has enhanced 
teacher quality as exemplified by student test scores.7   
While there are over 40 targeted and comprehensive National Science 
Foundation funded professional development partnerships around the country, one of the 
largest of the initial programs was the Appalachian Math and Science Partnership 
(AMSP).  The AMSP initially received a five year grant of $22.5 million from the 
National Science Foundation and began implementation in 2002-03.  AMSP began as a 
partnership among 38 Central and Eastern Kentucky school districts, 9 eastern 
Tennessee school districts, and 5 Virginia (western part of the state) school districts, the 
Kentucky Science and Technology Corporation, and 10 higher education institutions 
located in these three states although this paper focuses on Kentucky only because of 
data limitations.8  This area of the country is especially interesting because of its poor, 
rural population and longstanding achievement gap between rural schools and those of 
the urban areas of the same states.  A goal of AMSP was to demonstrate improved 
student achievement in mathematics and science in the central Appalachian region 
through the support of partnerships that unite the efforts of local schools with 
administrators and faculty at area colleges and universities.   
A requirement of each MSP is STEM faculty (most commonly math and science 
faculty but some engineering and computer science faculty) involvement from 
participating institutions of higher education.  In the AMSP, the higher education faculty 
                                                          
7 See Wong, Yin, Moyer-Packenham, and Scherer eds. (2008) for a special issue of the 
Peabody Journal of Education devoted to describing the design and implementation of 
these MSPs.  They look at some of the effects of the MSPs. 
8 The partnership has now been expanded to include five West Virginia school districts.  
The lead institution in this initiative was the University of Kentucky. 
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designed and delivered training programs for K-12 teachers of math and science.  The 
programs, for example, covered content training in algebra, geometry, statistics, physics, 
and biology among others although for reasons presented later, this paper will focus only 
on math training.9 The training programs were offered in a variety of settings.  In some 
cases, K-12 teachers traveled to the institution of higher education where the training 
was conducted; in most cases, the higher education faculty traveled to an Appalachian 
site accessible to K-12 teachers across multiple schools and districts.  The training 
varied in terms of hours per session and number of sessions offered for a particular 
course type (i.e., biology or algebra).  Some of the training occurred during the regular 
semester and other training took place in longer periods over the K-12 summer break.  
Other MSPs around the country differ in specifics but the higher education/K-12 
partnership model applies to all programs.   In all MSPs, it is assumed that the content 
expertise held by higher education faculty will translate into higher quality teaching at 
the K-12 level.  
 At the inception of the AMSP program, superintendents of Appalachian districts 
were invited to participate in AMSP.  Superintendents’ endorsed the training offered by 
AMSP or they did not endorse.   The districts that agreed to participate are illustrated by 
the map in Figure 2.1.  Beyond the initial agreement at the district level, there was no 
systematic means of selecting which teachers participated in the program.  Professional 
development activities were announced and teachers either voluntarily chose to 
participate or they chose not to participate.  Some teachers also participated who were  
                                                          
9 In a small number of cases the program covered content pedagogy. 
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Figure 2.1: Districts Participating in AMSP Training - Provided Data for the Study 
Note:  Dark red and dark green districts participated in this evaluation study.  Red and 
orange districts participated in the AMSP training. 
Figure 2.1: Districts Participating in A SP Training and Provi ing Data 
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Table 2.1:  Teacher Participation Rates in AMSP and in the Sample 
 AMSP Districts Non-AMSP Districts 
School Year All Sample All Sample 
2002-2003 0.018 0.010 0.001 0.007 
2003-2004 0.041 0.037 0.003 0.026 
2004-2005 0.067 0.051 0.008 0.035 
2005-2006 0.107 0.080 0.009 0.052 
2006-2007 0.080 0.071 0.005 0.048 
2007-2008 0.049 0.051 0.002 0.035 
2008-2009 0.020 0.019 0.001 0.013 
 
not teaching in an AMSP district.10 Table 2.1 illustrates the extent of teacher 
participation by year for districts that endorsed AMSP and those that did not.  I also 
illustrate the participation rates for the districts that agreed to be part of the sample for 
this study.  I discuss the data for this study in more detail below.    
 Note that in Kentucky, all K-12 teachers are required to participate in at least 4 
days of professional development activities annually.  The AMSP professional 
development activities satisfy annual teacher professional development training as 
required by the Kentucky Department of Education.   The state does not systematically 
monitor the effectiveness of these alternative PD activities nor does it centrally collect 
information about the specific types of activities chosen by the teachers.  Throughout 
this analysis, I implicitly am evaluating the AMSP effectiveness relative to the 
                                                          
10 In the sample used in this paper, approximately 10 percent of the teachers who 
participated in professional development were not employed by AMSP districts. 
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collection of all other types of in-service training.  Measured simply in terms of the 
opportunity costs of teachers for the 4 days of training, Kentucky spends over $42 
million annually on professional development activities.  On many margins, looking at 
effectiveness of training appears warranted.11 
Teacher Quality and Professional Development 
Before attempting to estimate who selects into AMSP and to examine its 
effectiveness, it is useful to think conceptually about whether and/or why I expect 
professional development activities to influence student outcomes and the circumstances 
under which they should be more or less effective.  Recall that the goal of MSPs is to 
enhance the math and science content knowledge of in-service teachers and, thereby, to 
enhance student learning.  Professional development may be best characterized as 
specific on-the-job training.  It is a form of targeted training for particular individuals.  
Viewed in this way, there is reason to believe that high quality professional development 
over some period of time should lead to more effective teaching and, therefore, higher 
student outcomes just as specific on-the-job-training leads to increased productivity in 
various private sector industries.  The literature on the effectiveness of content training 
at the pre-service level is mixed, however, which casts some doubt on the expected 
outcome for in-service professional development effects. 
Beyond the expected effectiveness, there are elements of professional 
development programs that present challenges as I think about measuring effectiveness.  
As already suggested, one of these elements is the means by which teachers select into 
                                                          
11 This number was calculated as a salary equivalent representing the opportunity costs 
of teachers’ absence from the classroom. 
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professional development activities.  Kentucky, as most states, requires teachers to 
participate in some sort of professional development each year as part of their 
continuing certification or licensure requirements. I am unaware of any state that 
requires that the programs prove effectiveness to be included in the list of acceptable 
professional development hours for the state.   
This raises an interesting dilemma for a teacher.  Suppose a teacher confronts a 
choice between “real” professional development and an activity that may provide more 
entertainment and/or be less taxing in terms of effort required on the part of the teacher.  
From a societal perspective, the welfare gains are highest from professional 
development if the teachers who reap the highest value-added from the training are the 
ones who participate in a professional development activity.  But teachers who benefit 
most from professional development may or may not be the ones most likely to pursue 
content training.  To illustrate, one could argue that the teachers who are weakest in 
terms of their own value-added for the students are the ones expected to gain the most 
from training.  Under increasing accountability of teachers, I may also expect them to be 
the most motivated to improve.  But these teachers may also be the least ambitious more 
generally as reflected by prior ineffectiveness in the classroom.  Conversely, the teachers 
who are most motivated generally and the ones with the most effective teaching records 
may be the ones more likely to enroll in rigorous, content-based professional 
development even though the value-added in knowledge and instructional effectiveness 
may be least for them.  Finally, there may be no relationship between a teacher’s past 
effectiveness, other observable characteristics, or even unobservable characteristics that 
influence her decision to participate in professional development activities.  
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Regardless of the direction of the effect, if there are systematic factors (either 
observed or unobserved) that influence which teachers choose to enroll in professional 
development, and these effects are not controlled in an empirical model, the 
effectiveness of the intervention itself will not be properly estimated.  The remainder of 
this paper looks at who chose to participate in AMSP and empirically estimates its 
subsequent effectiveness.   
Data  
The remainder of this paper will provide an analysis of the AMSP using 
individual student-teacher observations from the school year 2000-2001 through 2007-
08.12  This time period allows two years of observations prior to the AMSP intervention 
and covers its entire time of activity.  Although the training program includes schools 
across  4  states, this paper  looks only  at students  in Kentucky.13   Like  many states  to  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 An earlier paper looked at school level data for all Kentucky public elementary and 
secondary schools from the school year 2002-01 through 2005-06 (Foster and Toma, 
2008).   That paper addressed the issue of which particular school districts agreed to 
participate in AMSP and the subsequent effectiveness of the participation.  School level 
data are useful for identifying school level effects from a professional development 
intervention but they contain possible aggregation bias.   A preferred measurement of 
the effectiveness of an individual teacher’s participation in any professional 
development activity involves matching students to teachers and comparing the 
effectiveness of those teachers who participated to that of those teachers who did not 
participate while controlling for other observable and unobservable factors that may 
influence student outcomes.   
13 In a future paper, I will look at students in TN and VA as well.  The different testing 
systems of the states and the different schedule of tests pose special and interesting 
econometric challenges for combining the data across the three states. 
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Table 2.2:  Indicator of AMSP Participation and Years of Roster Data for 
Kentucky Districts 
District AMSP Participant Years of Roster Data 
Kentucky1 YES 2002-2008 
Kentucky2 YES 2001-2008 
Kentucky3 YES 2003-2008 
Kentucky4 NO 2001-2008 
Kentucky5 YES 2002-2008 
Kentucky6 NO 2003-2008 
Kentucky7 YES 2002-2008 
Kentucky8 NO 2003-2008 
Kentucky9 YES 2002-2008 
Kentucky10 NO 2004-2008 
 
date, Kentucky did not collect information that allows particular students to be matched 
to specific teachers over this time period.  To successfully identify which students were 
in a particular teacher’s classroom, I solicited the cooperation of local school districts in 
the Appalachian portion of the state.14  I invited all Appalachian districts to provide 
classroom roster data regardless of whether or not the school superintendents had 
officially agreed for their schools to participate in the partnership program.  The roster 
data for each school and each school year, lists the course, the teacher for the course, and 
all students who were enrolled in that course.   My ability to match students to specific 
teachers over the past 8 years varies by district.   Some districts retained all data from 
the past while others retained data for shorter periods of time.  As a result, I will have a 
                                                          
14 The Appalachian districts were chosen because they were the target of the AMSP PD 
activities.  This evaluation did not accompany the AMSP but followed it – adding to the 
challenges of data collection. 
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mixed panel of data. The resulting districts in Kentucky and the years of data availability 
are listed in Table 2.2.15 
Ten school districts in eastern Kentucky provided useable data for this project.  
The study required matching data from several state-level administrative data bases as 
well as class roster data from individual school districts.  The data were district-based 
and from a variety of state agencies and none were developed with the idea of being 
used for evaluation purposes.  Much of the matching required name and birth date or 
other person-specific characteristics.   
 Because the professional development program deals strictly with math and 
science, I theoretically can examine student performance in both subject areas but 
Kentucky’s testing schedule for science poses challenges for measuring annual value-
added that could be attributed to a specific teacher.   Standardized math and science test 
tests (known as Kentucky Core Content Tests) are administered annually in all schools 
in Kentucky but not at all grade levels each year.  From the 2000-2001 to the 2005-2006 
school years, the state tests covered science in grades 4, 7, and 11 and tested math in 
grades 5, 8, and 11.  Nationally standardized tests (the CTBS) were also administered to 
students in grades 3, 6, and 9 over the same years.  Beginning in 2006-07, state math 
testing was instituted annually in grades 3-8 and retained for 11th graders as well.  The 
years of science testing did not change.  Reading was tested (state tests) in grades 4, 7, 
and 10 through 2006 but like math it now is tested annually through 8th grade and in the 
10th grade for high school.  As I describe in the model, I take advantage of all subject 
                                                          
15 The payoff to the districts for providing data is a promise that I will share the results 
about teacher effectiveness with them.  The cost to participation for the district is staff 
time required to extract the data.   
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test results regardless of which subject matter I examine.  The value of using multiple 
past scores has been illustrated by McCaffrey et. al. (2003).  Scores from these exams 
are used to satisfy state reporting requirements for NCLB and are used as part of the 
accountability standards set by the Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1991.   Also like 
many states, the subjects tested and scaling of the tests have changed multiple times 
since 1991.   The change in the state’s test in 2007 was such that the scale of score in 
years prior cannot reliably be reconciled with those of 2007 and onward.16   In addition, 
each grade level test involves scores with different scales.  A 500 on a math test of a 5th 
grader was not designed to be equivalent to a 500 on the math test of an 8th grader. This 
means that grade levels must be examined separately for evaluation purposes.   The 
methods of addressing the scale changes and other challenges regarding testing are 
presented below.  Other student characteristics available for the matching are time-
invariant characteristics such as gender and race.  Free and reduced price lunch data vary 
slightly by school year.   
The Kentucky Department of Education (KDE) provided the individual student 
demographic and test score data for this analysis.  The student level data cover the years, 
2000-01 to 2008-09.   This includes two years of data prior to the onset of AMSP (in 
2002-03) and six years post the implementation of AMSP.  It is clear from the 
participation data in Table 2.1 that the program was phased in with the peak level of 
teacher participation (10 percent of all teachers) in 2005-06, a slight decline in 2006-07, 
and then a phase-out.  The Kentucky Education Professional Standards Board (EPSB)   
                                                          
16 This conclusion has been affirmed by officials of the Kentucky Department of 
Education. 
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Table 2.3: District Locale, Total Students and Number of Schools by Type of 
School 
 
provided teacher level data that also begin in the 2000-01 school year and continue to 
the present.   The available teacher-level data are quite comprehensive but I limit myself 
to experience of the teacher and highest degree achieved.  All other characteristics of the 
teachers such as Praxis scores, gender, and race are time invariant and are captured in 
the teacher fixed effects in the model below.  I also have school level characteristics that 
are time varying.   
District 
Urban-
Centric 
Locale 
Total 
Students 
2007-2008 
Primary 
Schools 
Middle 
Schools 
High 
Schools 
Other 
Schools 
Kentucky1 Rural: Distant 1,234 3 1 1 0 
Kentucky2 Rural: Distant 3,119 6 2 2 0 
Kentucky3 Rural: Fringe 2,196 3 1 1 0 
Kentucky4 City: Large 24,134 35 12 5 3 
Kentucky5 Town: Distant 2,399 3 1 1 0 
Kentucky6 Town: Distant 1,606 3 1 1 0 
Kentucky7 Rural: Remote 1,133 4 1 1 0 
Kentucky8 Rural: Remote 2,105 6 1 1 0 
Kentucky9 Rural: Distant 9,743 17 4 5 2 
Kentucky10 Suburb: Mid 663 1 2 1 0 
Total  48,332 81 26 19 5 
Kentucky 2: missing vocational high school 
Kentucky 3: missing one primary school one year, school switched to PK and K. 
Kentucky 4: there are additional vocational and alternative schools for which I did not receive data. 
Kentucky 5: missing 2001-2002 data for all primary schools. 
Kentucky 9: name/location change 15 elementary schools over all years;  name/location change 3 
schools over all years 
Kentucky 8: missing 2003 data for middle schools 
Kentucky 10: primary available 2006-2008; middle school available 2004-2007; high school 
available 2004-2005, 2007-2008 
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Table 2.3 provides additional information about the 10 school districts I am 
examining.  As illustrated here, these are small, rural districts with typically a single 
high school but multiple elementary schools.17  Of these 10 districts, 6 districts formally 
participated in the partnership professional development activities beginning in 2002-03 
but 4 districts did not officially participate with AMSP as a provider of professional 
development activities.18  Regardless of official district level participation, teachers in 
all districts were permitted to enroll in the training activities and in the non-participating 
district, teachers crossed district lines for the training activities even though the 
superintendent had not formally joined AMSP.  Participation rates tended to be higher in 
those districts whose superintendents agreed.  In the non-AMSP districts for this 
analysis, there were 10 percent of teachers who selected to participate in the professional 
development activities.  Table 2.4 presents summary data on teacher participation, 
including the total number of unique teachers involved in the in-service training by 
district and year.  The AMSP program provided the data on teacher participation. 
          After receiving the data from multiple sources, I matched the data so that I 
observe each student who is testing in math or science in a given year and for which I 
can identify the teacher(s) who taught that student in those content courses.  The total 
number of student-teacher observations for the analysis is slightly more than 700,000  
  
                                                          
17 Kentucky has traditionally had small, county-based school districts with additional 
districts for the county seats (the largest town typically) in many cases.  Nine of the 10 
districts in this sample are county-based.  One of the advantages of this study is its focus 
on professional development in rural schools. 
18As noted earlier, all Kentucky teachers are required to participate in a minimum of 4 
days of PD activities annually.  The quality of the data on the alternative PD types varies 
considerably by district and there is no state collection of these data.  
  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Number of Teachers with AMSP Professional Development in Math by District by School Year 
 
 
District AMSP Participant 
2002-
2003 
2003-
2004 
2004-
2005 
2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
Total 
teacher/years 
Total 
Teachers 
Total  
hours 
Average  
hours 
per 
teacher 
Kentucky1 YES 0 5 3 9 10 1 28 17 364 21.41 
Kentucky2 YES 0 0 14 35 21 21 91 48 1,629 33.94 
Kentucky3 YES 0 2 0 5 2 16 25 23 321 13.96 
Kentucky4 NO 1 1 9 4 0 1 16 14 693 49.50 
Kentucky5 YES 0 4 2 4 0 0 10 7 666 95.14 
Kentucky6 NO 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2.00 
Kentucky7 YES 0 2 1 5 1 0 9 6 520 86.67 
Kentucky8 NO 0 0 2 1 0 0 3 2 180 90.00 
Kentucky9 YES 0 2 33 17 10 13 75 58 2,429 41.88 
Kentucky10 NO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Total    1 16 64 80 44 53 258 176 6,804 38.66 
21 
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics for selective sample in 2005 for grades 5, 8, and 11 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Free and Reduced Price Lunch 11,929 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Female 11,695 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Asian 11,715 0.02 0.12 0 1 
Black 11,715 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Hispanic 11,715 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Native American 11,715 <0.00 0.01 0 1 
Other 11,715 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Avg. Experience (School) 11,929 12.30 2.10 5.3 17.7 
Enrollment 11,929 681.94 423.17 80 2,062 
Percent Masters’ Degree 11,929 76.09 11.26 35 100 
Percent Free and Reduced  11,929 0.51 0.212 0 .97 
Expenditure per Student 11,929 5,708.21 1,208.24 3,908 12,837 
Student Teacher Ratio 11,929 15.15 2.38 8 22 
Student Computer Ratio 11,929 4.01 1.28 1.6 7.6 
Math Index 11,929 71.52 12.35 41.97 112.69 
Experience 11,929 12.085 8.973 0 34 
Experience Squared 11,929 226.552 269.009 0 1,156 
Highest Degree1 11,929 3.083 1.301 1 7 
 1– Highest degree coded as follows: 1=Bachelor’s, 2=5th year, 3=Planned 6th year, 4=Master’s, 5=Rank I, 6=Specialist, 7=Doctorate 
 
but this includes teachers and students across all grade levels regardless of whether there 
are standardized tests. Table 2.5 provides descriptive statistics for the students, teachers, 
and schools for the 10 districts.  The statistics vary somewhat by year and here I present 
school year 2005-06 as a representative year because it is a year in which all districts 
provided roster data.  As stated earlier, because Kentucky tests science only in grades 4, 
7, and 11, I focus on math performance in this analysis.   
Model and Results 
 Given the changing scale of the test score data over the time period I observe and 
the multiple exams (state and national), the use of standardized test scores as variables (as 
in a standard value-added model) is somewhat problematic for estimating the 
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effectiveness of the professional development activities.  Ballou (2009) summarizes the 
many issues associated with scaling and the use of standardized test scores.   Because 
changing scales make increases and decreases in scores difficult to interpret, I do not use 
the scores as the dependent variable.  Instead, to mitigate the test score issues, I convert 
the Kentucky standardized exam scores to ranks.  Ranks are well defined for any scale 
and comparable as long as the tests have validity for the same ability measure—math, 
science, or reading, in the present case.  Students’ ranks on scores have been used 
recently by Arcidiacono (2004; 2005) and Betebenner (2009), and they have an 
advantage over test scores (raw or scaled) in that no attempt is made to compare the 
meaning of a unit change in score. 19  The rankings, on the other hand, imply that I cannot 
link teacher effectiveness to a quantitative measure of student learning by using units of 
change in test scores.  Appendix A also illustrates the results using z-scores.  These 
results may differ as z-scores are a nonlinear transformation of scores and ranks represent 
a linear transformation. 
Because I use ranks from the standardized exams rather than the scores, it is 
useful to discuss the rank data a bit further.  I rank students on their performance on the 
state tests in math, science, and reading although I am using only the first one as a 
dependent variable.      To compute the ranks, I grouped all students taking a particular 
grade-relevant exam per year.  For example, all students in the sample who participated 
                                                          
19 Ranks, like percentiles, reduce the importance of extremes in the data relative to the 
more frequently used z-scores.  Percentiles would be preferred over ranks if the 
dependent variable was a “change” score.   As will become clear in the model 
description, I use past ranks as control variables rather than examine the difference in two 
rankings for a student so either ranks or percentiles are appropriate.  Ranks can be more 
informative than percentiles in that a student can change rank from year to year without 
changing percentile.   
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in the math exam in the eighth grade for school year 2006-07 were ranked together.  I did 
not cross subject exam, grade levels, or years in ranking the students. 
 Before discussing the model and results, I address the technical aspects of 
selection and subsequent treatment effects that motivated the empirical methods used.  In 
an experimental setting, where treatment was randomized, the methods I use below 
would not be necessary.20  However, as is the case with many program evaluations, the 
decision to participate in the professional development was not likely random but, rather, 
a deliberate teacher choice and a function of teacher and school characteristics.  In such 
cases, where both the decision and outcome of treatment are correlated with the 
covariates, the resulting estimation of the average treatment effect is most likely biased.  
 Accounting for this bias requires the use of a counterfactual argument.  Because I 
cannot see both teacher j’s treatment and non-treatment outcome, I cannot determine the 
effect of treatment.  By matching teachers with similar covariates, but with different 
participation decisions, the effects of treatment can be estimated.  With many covariates 
this is often unmanageable, but the use of matched propensity scores generated by a 
probit estimation allows teachers to be matched more easily.  To illustrate, a participating 
teacher is matched based on her propensity score to a non-participating teacher to 
generate a replacement treatment and non-treatment outcome.  Once all participating 
teachers are matched with a non-participating teacher, a teacher fixed effects estimation 
can be used to estimate the effect of the professional development treatment. 
                                                          
20 Here I use randomization of treatment rather than the offer of treatment. 
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 Typically the covariates are observable factors that contribute to both treatment 
and outcomes.  In fact, if treatment and outcomes are based on unobservable factors this 
method does not properly control for selection bias.  My approach explicitly controls for 
the potential influence of unobservable factors in the treatment decision and outcome by 
estimating teacher fixed effects and including them in the estimate of participation and 
the resulting propensity scores on which the teachers are matched.   
For estimating purposes, I want to both look at which teachers selected into 
AMSP and to subsequently examine its effectiveness.  In other words, I question whether 
teachers are randomly choosing this particular, content-focused professional 
development.  As described above, if selection is not random, estimates of the 
effectiveness of the intervention must account for the selection mechanism.  The model 
will consist of three stages. 
 First, the teacher’s past effectiveness is estimated as follows.  I estimate for each 
student-teacher year combination the student outcome: 
(1) 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝑐𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where R is the relative ranking of each student i in the sample on the standardized math 
exam in year t and the 𝛽𝑖′𝑠 are estimated coefficients.  The grade level is not listed 
because math exams and year (t) are always associated with certain grade levels.  The 
rankings are a function of the same student’s rankings on the most recent prior test on 
math as well as the two other subject areas.21  If the most recent test was a nationally 
                                                          
21 I use all prior test scores on math, science, and reading because of the interval timing 
of these tests in Kentucky.  Note that the lagged test score could be one to two years 
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standardized math test (CTBS) rather than the state test, I used ranks on that test as a 
control variable.  A vector of variables, D, describes the demographics of student i in year 
t, T is a vector of student i’s math teacher (j) experience and degree variables in year t, 
and the vector, SC, describes characteristics of the school for which the student-teacher 
combination is observed.  The term, θ𝑗, represents a teacher fixed effect, 𝑐𝑗 the teacher-
clustered error term, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error.
22  Estimation of equation (1) yields 
a predicted ranking, 𝑅�𝑖𝑡 for each student that is based on that student’s own 
demographics, past test performance, the student’s teacher, and his or her school 
attended.  To develop a measure of teacher effectiveness, I estimated this equation for 
school years 2003 through 2008.23  In the estimation, the current year as well as all 
preceding years are included to generate an estimate of the predicted student rank and, for 
my purpose, a teacher fixed effect.  For example, in year t, the estimated fixed effect for a 
given teacher j is the average effect of the unobservable characteristics of teacher j from 
2000-01 through year t.   
This estimate of teacher effectiveness is then substituted into the equation (2) 
below in year t+1 in which I estimate a probit equation for teacher participation in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
earlier depending on the subject tested. Of great interest, the correlation coefficients on 
student ranks are remarkably similar across the 3 subject areas.  For example, 8th grade 
math ranks across the panel have a correlation coefficient of 0.56 with the prior math test, 
0.54 with the most recent reading exam, and 0.58 with the lagged science exam.  Recall, 
that through 2006, math was tested in grades 5, 8, and 11.  After 2006, the test is annual.  
See McCafferty et. al. (2003) for discussion of the value of using as many past test results 
as available in value-added models.   
22 I do not cluster the error term on schools because there is little mobility of teachers 
across schools in this panel; that is, a given teacher is usually at one school only. 
23 The equations are estimated for these years only because these are the years in which a 
teacher could decide to participate in the PD. 
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AMSP.24  In particular, I estimate the probability of teacher j choosing to participate in 
the professional development activities in year t as: 
(2) 𝑃𝐷𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝜃�𝑗𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜀 
where PD is a binary variable indicating whether a teacher chose to participate in the 
professional development activities of a given year or did not.25  The independent 
variables includes a vector of time-varying teacher characteristics; a vector of school 
level characteristics in each year t including the lagged school’s performance level; and 𝜃�  
is the constructed measure of the teacher’s past effectiveness in the classroom.  I include 
this as a means of testing whether the teacher’s own effectiveness in the classroom 
motivates her to choose the content-based professional development and, if so, whether 
the motivation is in a positive or negative way. 
 Table 2.6 presents the results from estimating the student rank (equation 1) for 
students in grades 5, 8, and 11 over the 2000-01 to 2007-08 data.  The results are 
consistent with expectations predicted by the literature on student outcomes.  The lagged 
math ranks for the student are important both statistically and in magnitude in explaining 
the student’s current rank at all grade levels.  Higher ranks on the previous math test 
imply a higher rank on the current exam.  Also statistically significant at the .01 level are  
 
 
                                                          
24 An alternative approach would include the use of an instrumental variables model to 
predict participation.  Unfortunately, I have no instrument that explains participation that 
also potentially does not explain student performance. 
25 I model the participation decision as a yes or no.  In reality, the teacher could choose 
among activities with varying hours.  The propensity scores generated from this probit 
estimate are correlated at the .01 level with the number of hours of participation.  The 
hours of participation were clustered and not normally distributed. 
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Table 2.6: Student Achievement with Teacher Fixed Effects (00-08) 
Independent Variables Grade 5  Grade 8 Grade 11 
Math Rank Lagged 0.369 *** 0.476 *** 0.433 *** 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.014) 
 Science Rank Lagged 0.224 *** 0.224 *** 0.274 *** 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 Reading Rank Lagged  0.255 *** 0.193 *** 0.099 *** 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
    Student Characteristics 
      Free and Reduced Price (FRP) Lunch -246.370 *** -188.627 *** -65.668 *** 
 
(20.510) 
 
(17.516) 
 
(13.003) 
 Female -34.783 ** -54.732 *** -58.272 *** 
 
(15.957) 
 
(12.029) 
 
(10,737) 
 Asian 460.173 *** 586.069 *** 386.307 *** 
 
(56.740) 
 
(47.091) 
 
(47.426) 
 Black -292.138 *** -318.987 *** -263.128 *** 
 
(26.667) 
 
(22.748) 
 
(19.276) 
 Hispanic -124.143 *** -178.853 *** -233.565 *** 
 
(44.062) 
 
(39.535) 
 
(45.952) 
 Native American 239.453 
 
-558.093 ** -477.576 ** 
 
(264.329) 
 
(228.737) 
 
(200.553) 
 Other -39.347 
 
115.232 ** -48.399 
 
 
(73.329) 
 
(58.761) 
 
(61.212) 
    School Characteristics 
      Class Size 2.794 ** 0.221
 
-1.243
 
 
(1.327) 
 
(1.298) 
 
(1.426) 
 Average Experience -7.567 
 
-10.725 
 
16.886 ** 
 
(12.236) 
 
(9.957) 
 
(8.422) 
 Enrollment 0.086 
 
0.102 * 0.047 
 
 
(0.89) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.044) 
 Percent Master's -0.657 
 
2.347 ** -3.478 *** 
 
(0.820) 
 
(1.034) 
 
(0.994) 
 Percent of FRP Students 92.872 
 
8.342 
 
-237.259 
 
 
(63.310) 
 
(62.673) 
 
(59.490) 
 Expenditure per Student 0.006 
 
0.029 * 0.014 
 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.020) 
 Student-Teacher Ratio -0.792 
 
-15.621 * -10.018 
 
 
(10.123) 
 
(9.422) 
 
(6.855) 
 Student-Computer Ratio -3.466 
 
6.842 
 
-1.284 
 
 
(9.185) 
 
(7.257) 
 
(4.528) 
 Math Index 0.829 
 
2.904 *** 3.150 ** 
 
(0.883) 
 
(0.875) 
 
(1.278) 
    Teacher Characteristics 
      Highest Degree Obtained -35.181
 
14.578
 
34.481 * 
 
(31.330) 
 
(21.546) 
 
(18.059) 
 Experience 4-7 Years -223.132 ** -110.904 
 
96.746 ** 
 
(105.680) 
 
(72.339) 
 
(42.324) 
 Experience 8-12 Years -196.710 ** -112.714 
 
33.986 
 
 
(98.659) 
 
(81.555) 
 
(53.861) 
 Experience 13-17 Years -332.442 *** -96.951 
 
63.302 
 
 
(124.589) 
 
(99.846) 
 
(64.209) 
 Experience 18 Years and Higher -436.147 *** -70.630 
 
74.983 
 
 
(144.120) 
 
(100.205) 
 
(73.347) 
 N 22859   27952   18009   
F-Test  481.99 *** 977.68 ***  545.29 ***  
Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses are presented in the table. 
*indicates 0.10 level of significance ** indicates 0.05 level of significance, *** indicates 0.01 level of significance 
 
 29 
 
past reading and science scores although as expected, the magnitudes of the coefficients 
are less than with the math scores.   
 In interpreting the remaining independent variables, note that the dependent 
variable, RANK, is constructed with the lowest ranking student receiving the number one 
rank.  In addition to the lagged test ranks that are significant across all past subject tests 
and grade levels, student characteristics also significantly influence rank across grade 
levels.  Free and reduced price lunch students perform at lower levels than full price 
lunch students.  In all three grades, Asian students significantly outperform White 
students (the omitted category) and Black, Hispanic, and Native American students 
significantly underperform (rank) relative to White students. These results are 
particularly striking given the low percentages of minority students in the schools in this 
sample.  See again the descriptive statistics in Table 2.5. 
School level characteristics are less consistent in their contribution to student 
rankings across grade levels.  At grade 5, class size is significant but has the opposite sign 
than expected.  Larger classes are associated with a higher average student rank.   In 8th 
grade, larger schools are associated with higher ranks as are the percent of teachers 
holding a master’s degree and expenditures per pupil.  Of particular interest, the school 
level math index score is significant indicating that the overall performance of the school 
as measured by a state index score, significantly affects the performance of the student.  
This is consistent with many findings in the literature.  By grade 11, it appears that a 
higher level of experience for the school’s teachers contributes positively to student rank 
and now the percent of teachers with a master’s degree has switched signs is contributes 
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negatively to student ranks.  Again, the school’s performance in math affects the 
individual student ranks on average.   
Finally, I look at the teachers paired to the students that I am examining and the 
effect of observable characteristics on student rank.  At grade 5, teacher experience 
matters for student rank but not in the way typically found in the literature.26  All 
categories of experience for teachers point to lower ranks for experienced teachers than 
for those teachers in the first 3 years of experience.  This is not true at the 8th and 11th 
grades.  Now experience is either insignificant or for 11th grade teachers, 4-7 years of 
experience improves student rankings over that of teachers with less than 4 years of 
experience.    
For my purpose, the primary intention for estimating the above student ranks is to 
capture the teacher fixed effects.27  At each of the three grade levels, the teacher fixed 
effects are explaining a significant portion of the variance in rank performance.  Teacher 
fixed effects explain 35  percent of the variance in 5th grade student ranks, 28 percent of 
the variance in 8th grade ranks they explain 35 percent of the variance in ranks of 11th 
graders.  These results are consistent with the findings of Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 
(2005), and corroborated by others, that teachers matter in ways that are not easily 
observable. 
  
                                                          
26 This finding does not hold when I enter experience as a quadratic term rather than in 
categorical form.  The signs are as expected although generally insignificant with the 
latter form.   
27 I use the net teacher fixed effect, or the unobservable effect rather than the gross effect 
because the unobservable portion better captures the motivation to participate that I am 
seeking to capture. 
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Table 2.7: Predicted Teacher Participation  
Independent Variables Coefficient Standard Error 
    Teacher Characteristics    
Lagged Effectiveness -0.007 ** 0.000 
Max Degree Held 0.130 *** 0.035 
Experience -0.011 
 
0.016 
Experience Squared 0.000 
 
0.001 
 
       School Characteristics    
Average Experience 0.085 *** 0.018 
Enrollment 0.000 *** 0.000 
Percent Master's -0.012 *** 0.003 
 Percent of FRP Students 0.010 *** 0.002 
Expenditure per Student 0.000 *** 0.000 
Student-Computer Ratio 0.022 
 
0.024 
Math Index -0.008 *** 0.002 
N 3,970     
Log Likelihood -567.317 ***    
*indicates 0.10 level of significance ** indicates 0.05 level of significance, *** indicates 0.01 level of   
significance 
 
 
 Using the measure of past teacher effectiveness constructed from these fixed 
effects, I present the results from estimating the probability that a teacher will choose to 
participate in AMSP professional development in any given year in Table 2.7.  The 
variable of greatest interest for my purpose is the lagged fixed effect, or past teacher 
effectiveness.  The coefficient on the lagged effectiveness variable is significant in 
explaining a teacher’s choice to participate in professional development.  The negative 
sign implies that teachers with lower past effectiveness as reflected in student ranks are 
more likely to choose to participate in AMSP professional development.28  Viewed from 
this perspective alone, it appears that voluntary selection of teachers into AMSP was not 
                                                          
28 Recall again that ranks are in ascending order with one being bottom-performing. 
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random.  In particular, weaker teachers are the ones who tended to choose to participate 
in AMSP professional development.  Note that school level characteristics are also 
significant in explaining an individual teacher’s selection into the professional 
development.    
 Other variables also help explain the probability of participating.  Teachers who 
have higher education levels are more likely to participate in the AMSP in-service 
training.  Of particular interest and not surprising is the fact that school level variables 
explain a great deal of the individual probability of participating.  Teachers from schools 
in which the average level of experience is higher are more likely to participate.  
Teachers from larger schools are less likely to participate and teachers from schools with 
a higher percentage with master’s degrees are less likely to participate.  As expected 
because of the nature of this program, teachers from schools with a higher percent of 
students with free and reduced price lunch are more likely to participate and those with 
higher expenditures per pupil are less likely to participate.  Finally, the quality of the 
school level output as reflected in the math index score of the school influence 
participation probabilities.  Teachers from better schools are less likely to participate.  
Taken together, the significant, negative teacher fixed effects and the school 
characteristics suggest that weaker teachers and those from lower quality schools are the 
ones most likely to participate in AMSP. 29    
                                                          
29 I also ran the probit model using teacher effectiveness measured in deciles.  The results 
support those reported here.  Teachers in the lower decile ranks (3 and 4) were more 
likely to participate while those in the 10th decile (highest and best) were significantly 
less likely to participate in the professional development activities. 
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 With these probit estimates, I next construct propensity scores for a given 
teacher’s propensity to enroll in professional development in a given year.30   I use the 
teacher propensity scores to create a sample of teachers for which I can estimate the 
effectiveness of the professional development intervention. The sample is based on 
matching each AMSP participant to a non-participant using the nearest neighbor 
matching procedure from the estimated probit model.  This improves the sample by 
enhancing the ability of the sample to have the property of “overlap” (Wooldridge (2010, 
pp. 910-911):  “…estimating the average treatment effect will require being able to 
observe both control and treated units for every outcome on [the data].31  The kernel 
densities of the propensity scores (see Figure 2.2) show that there is considerable non-
overlap in both tails for participants (treatment) and non-participants (control), and the 
matching reduces the sample to equal groups of teachers (not equal groups of students) 
with extremely similar propensity scores.32 Therefore, this smaller sample should be 
more reliable in estimating the effect of AMSP than the entire sample of teachers.  
The results above provide evidence that teacher selection into the professional 
development activities of AMSP was not random.  While I offered no prior expectation 
about the direction of bias influencing selection, it appears that weaker teachers did select 
into the professional development.  Finally, I am in a position to examine the final 
question posed  for  this paper.  Did  the AMSP professional development intervention 
                                                          
30 As mentioned previously, the propensity score allows me to estimate the effects of the 
covariates on the probability of participation so that participating and non-participating 
teachers can be matched to create a treatment and non-treatment counterfactual.   
31 This assumption is typically called the overlap assumption.  Overlap means that, for 
any setting of the covariates in the assumed population, there is a chance of seeing units 
in both the control and treatment groups.”  The use of propensity scores is described in 
detail on pages 909-915 of Wooldridge (2010).  
32 The propensity scores were matched to the thousandths. 
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have an effect on the math teachers’ effectiveness as reflected in the ranks of their 
students?  To answer this question, I ran a teacher fixed effect model on the following 
equation:  
(3)  𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑀𝑆𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where all variables are described as in equation 1 but with the addition of the AMSP 
variable.  AMSP is a binary variable that captures whether the teacher participated in the 
AMSP professional development in a given year or not and reflects the sample 
construction defined above.   
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Figure 2.2: Kernel Density of Participating and Non-participating Teachers 
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 The results from estimating the effects of AMSP on student rank performance are 
presented in Table 2.8.  Teacher participation in the content-based AMSP professional 
development had a significant effect on 5th and 11th grades’ student rank performance.  
Using the propensity-derived sample of teachers and matching to their students over the 
entire time period observed, the students of those teachers who participated in the AMSP 
training outperformed in rank those students whose teachers who did not participate.  In 
the 8th grade, however, the results do not hold.  At these grade levels, the AMSP 
participation results in no significant difference for those students whose teachers 
participated and those who did not participate. It is unclear why the payoffs do not appear 
for 8th grade teachers. 
Other control variables again behave generally as expected.  Most notably, the 
students’ own rank on tests in prior years continues to be significant in explaining current 
ranks as do other student and school characteristics.  Particularly interesting, the school 
quality variable as capture in the math index score is now insignificant in explaining 
student ranks at the 5th and 8th grade levels although it continues to help explain 11th 
grade ranks.  Given the strong role of school quality in explaining participation 
propensity, the insignificance of the index score is perhaps not surprising.  Other than the 
participation variable, there are few teacher characteristics that contribute to student ranks 
in these estimates.  Teachers who hold higher degrees continue to positively influence 5th 
grade ranks but not 8th or 11th grade ranks.  One category of teacher experience, 4 to 7 
years, appears to be less effective than the least experienced teachers but all others are 
insignificant.    
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Table 2.8:  Student Achievement: Censored With AMSP Participation Propensities 
Independent Variables Grade 5 Grade 8 Grade 11 
Math Rank Lagged 0.416 *** 0.517 *** 0.382 *** 
 (0.018)  
(0.013) 
 
(0.018) 
 Science Rank Lagged 0.178 *** 0.207 *** 0.259 *** 
 (0.018)  
(0.013) 
 
(0.017) 
 Reading Rank Lagged 0.253 *** 0.171 *** 0.135 *** 
 (0.019)  (0.013)  
(0.018) 
            Student Characteristics 
      Free and Reduced Price (FRP) Lunch -221.907 *** -114.847 *** 0.947
  (34.822)  
(24.237) 
 
(28.304) 
 Female -49.193 
 
-75.317 *** -39.273 
  (31.653)  
(23.549) 
 
(27.936) 
 Non-white -164.302 * -144.373 ** 0.000 * 
 (84.096)  
(72.977) 
 
(94.432) 
 Class size 1.683 
 
2.247 
 
4.390 
  (2.125)  (2.972)  
(2.875) 
            School Characteristics 
      Average Experience -490.503 *** -100.032 *** 28.343
  (117.126)  
(42.307) 
 
(46.866) 
 Enrollment 3.365 * 0.556 
 
-5.799 *** 
 (1.760)  
(0.931) 
 
(1.842) 
 Percent Master’s 14.678 *** -0.005 
 
0.858 
  (4.484)  
(2.415) 
 
(3.609) 
 Percent of FRP Students 252.479 
 
-444.412 *** 155.044 
  (179.601)  
(154.500) 
 
(159.462) 
 Expenditure per Student -0.086 
 
0.261 * 0.152 ** 
 (0.064)  
(0.136) 
 
(0.076) 
 Student-Teacher Ratio 194.655 *** -32.196 
 
220.401 *** 
 (63.139)  
(37.296) 
 
(74.473) 
 Student-Computer Ratio 59.538 
 
23.464 
 
-118.509 *** 
 (79.274)  
(32.195) 
 
(41.502) 
 Math Index 2.868 
 
2.846 
 
37.551 *** 
 (7.832)  (6.628)  
(7.068) 
            Teacher Characteristics       Participation in AMSP PD 215.019 * -44.736
 
157.560 *** 
 (125.206)  (69.408)  
(70.926) 
 Highest Degree Obtained 447.020 ** 80.725 
 
-192.241 
  (210.544)  (54.166)  
(600.938) 
 Experience 4-7 Years -1110.156 * -154.100 * 932.595 
 
 
(597.908) 
 
(86.678) 
 
(1,820.060) 
 Experience 8-12 Years -719.150 
 
-140.509 
 
983.457 
 
 
(848.763) 
 
(143.228) 
 
(1,875.215) 
 Experience 13-17 Years -712.986 
 
-84.059 
 
845.810 
 
 
(1,083.843) 
 
(218.908) 
 
(1,879,568) 
 Experience 18 Years and Higher -222.000 
      (1,208.937)      N  3,221   5,087   2,119   
F-Test 121.70 *** 304.31 *** 105.18 *** 
Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses are presented in the table. 
*indicates 0.10 level of significance ** indicates 0.05 level of significance, *** indicates 0.01 level of significance 
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Finally, as a comparison of my results, I estimated a teacher fixed effects model using the 
full sample of observations of teachers and students.  Table 2.9 reports the results using 
the observed AMSP participation on the full sample of teacher-student observations with 
teacher fixed effects.  The results of that model indicate that the in-service training had 
positive results on teacher effectiveness for 11th grade students but not middle or 
elementary level students.    
Taken together, the results from this analysis suggest that the AMSP program 
targeted weaker teachers because weaker teachers are affiliated with weaker schools.  
Looking at similar teachers and contrasting those who participated with those that did 
not, the results suggest the program did have positive effects for the students of 
elementary and high school teachers.  I am left with a puzzle.  Why did content training 
increase effectiveness for these two levels but not middle school teachers?  On surface, it 
seems that pre-service training in content subjects would have been more likely for 
middle and high school teachers than for elementary teachers.  A next step would be to 
gather additional data on pre-service coursework or math aptitude for the teachers to see 
if there is some relationship to pre-service training and in-service training gains. 
Concluding Comments            
 This paper addresses an important topic for an understudied and chronically 
underachieving group of students.   Improving teacher quality in poor, rural schools is an 
important issue not just for schools in central Appalachia.  Among the 10 states with the 
highest rates of poverty, 57 percent of the school districts and 36 percent of students are 
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Table 2.9: Student Achievement with Teacher Fixed Effects and Participation 
(Actual) 
Independent Variables Grade 5  Grade 8 Grade 11 
Math Rank Lagged 0.369 *** 0.476 *** 0.433 *** 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.014) 
 Science Rank Lagged 0.224 *** 0.224 *** 0.274 *** 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 Reading Rank Lagged  0.255 *** 0.193 *** 0.099 *** 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
    Student Characteristics 
      Free and Reduced Price (FRP) 
 
-246.398 *** -189.319 *** -65.892 *** 
 
(20.505) 
 
(17.336) 
 
(12.925) 
 Female -34.805 ** -54.798 *** -58.294 *** 
 
(15.970) 
 
(12.056) 
 
(10.707) 
 Asian 460.242 *** 585.340 *** 386.516 *** 
 
(56.735) 
 
(47.085) 
 
(47.441) 
 Black -292.162 *** -318.763 *** -262.862 *** 
 
(26.669) 
 
(22.737) 
 
(19.257) 
 Hispanic -124.199 *** -178.535 *** -233.661 *** 
 
(44.060) 
 
(39.607) 
 
(46.011) 
 Native American 240.467 
 
-560.013 ** -478.218 ** 
 
(264.506) 
 
(229.273) 
 
(201.035) 
 Other -39.374 
 
115.547 ** -48.552 
 
 
(73.328) 
 
(58.733) 
 
(61.238) 
     School Characteristics 
      Class Size 2.771 ** 0.077
 
-1.085
 
 
(1.303) 
 
(1.285) 
 
(1.446) 
 Average Experience -7.759 
 
-9.906 
 
17.268 ** 
 
(12.100) 
 
(9.899) 
 
(8.221) 
 Enrollment 0.087 
 
0.107 * 0.054 
 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.045) 
 Percent Master's -0.631 
 
2.485 ** -3.329 *** 
 
(0.830) 
 
(1.051) 
 
(0.995) 
 Percent of FRP Students 94.541 
 
22.008 
 
-218.719 *** 
 
(646.107) 
 
(64.384) 
 
(62.105) 
 Expenditure per Student 0.007 
 
0.028 * 0.014 
 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.019) 
 Student-Teacher Ratio -0.909 
 
-16.678 * -11.526 
 
 
(10.129) 
 
(9.607) 
 
(7.151) 
 Student-Computer Ratio -3.483 
 
5.498 
 
-1.235 
 
 
(9.163) 
 
(6.954) 
 
(4.442) 
 Math Index 0.828 
 
2.957 *** 3.222 ** 
 
(0.885) 
 
(0.882) 
 
(1.286) 
    Teacher Characteristics 
      Participation in AMSP PD 14.348
 
43.663
 
79.274 ** 
 
(37.569) 
 
(54.654) 
 
(39.796) 
 Highest Degree Obtained -34.667 
 
13.053 
 
34.686 * 
 
(31.500) 
 
(19.596) 
 
(17.912) 
 Experience 4-7 Years -223.719 ** -117.065 
 
93.877 *** 
 
(105.393) 
 
(73.497) 
 
(41.389) 
 Experience 8-12 Years -197.157 ** -117.580 
 
25.328 
 
 
(98.298) 
 
(82.189) 
 
(50.653) 
 Experience 13-17 Years -332.487 *** -112.060 
 
48.836 
 
 
(124.566) 
 
(99.183) 
 
(62.116) 
 Experience 18 Years and Higher -435.132 *** -84.856 
 
63.351 
 
 
(144.455) 
 
(99.015) 
 
(72.064) 
 N 22,861  27,952  18,009  
F-Test 478.93 ***  942.55 ***  542.60 ***  
  Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses are presented in the table. 
 *indicates 0.10 level of significance ** indicates 0.05 level of significance, *** indicates 0.01 level of significance 
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located in rural areas. The unique problems that these schools face in bridging the 
achievement gap, especially in terms of teacher quality, are worthy of study.  Because 
many teachers attend college in the region in which they teach (Boyd et. al. 2005b), there 
is reason to believe that the pre-service training of many rural teachers may be weaker 
than that of their counterparts in more urban areas of the same states.  A policy question 
is whether in-service training can compensate for the pre-service differences in training 
that may exist.   
  I argue that correctly evaluating an in-service program requires accounting for 
teacher selection into the professional development activities. By looking at the teacher’s 
own past effectiveness, I find that this particular program, through targeting poor 
performing districts, succeeded in attracting the weakest teachers into the professional 
development activities.  Significant effects from the professional development 
subsequently were found at both the elementary and high school levels.  Why it did not 
succeed at the middle school level is an additional question to be addressed.  This is the 
beginning of a research agenda to assess whether professional development can 
compensate for weak pre-service training.  This paper does not provide the definitive 
answer but provides a road map for future evaluations.  More research is necessary. 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Nathan Barrett 2011 
 
 
 40 
 
CHAPTER 3 
REWARD OR PUNISHMENT? CLASS SIZE AND TEACHER QUALITY. 
Introduction 
 A major focus in both education research and in education policy currently is on 
teacher quality.   Recent research has emphasized the importance of quality teachers in 
explaining student achievement (Darling-Hammond 2000; Guarino, Santibanez, and 
Daley 2006; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005; Rowan, Correnti, and Miller 2002; 
Sanders and Rivers 1996).  This finding is so critical that it became one of the focal 
points for the No Child Left Behind legislation (NCLB) enacted in 2001 and continues to 
be a driver of the emphasis on data collection in the federal Race to the Top competition. 
Indeed, researchers, policymakers, and families appear not to question the common sense 
finding that teachers matter in student outcomes.   
 While most agree anecdotally that teachers matter, a challenge remains from a 
research perspective.  Studies attempting to identify the characteristics of teachers that 
define “quality” are beset by mixed results.33  While new teachers are generally identified 
as relative weak teachers, other characteristics are less straightforward (Clotfelter et al. 
2007; Harris and Sass 2007).34  Degree held by the teacher, salary earned, gender and 
ethnicity, and other measured characteristics seem to generate few consistent effects 
when measuring teacher effectiveness.  Generally, evidence shows that teachers do have 
                                                          
33 I assume teacher quality to be the impact teachers have on student outcomes.  
34 In this context, new teachers can be considered to be those with less than three to five 
years of experience. 
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differential effects on student learning but the task of explaining why some teachers 
perform better than others remains open.   
The lack of measurable characteristics to define teacher quality has been viewed 
as an argument against teacher performance evaluations and differential compensation for 
teachers.  The concern has been that subjectivity and bias on the part of principals and 
superintendents will mean that administrators’ favorite teachers are rewarded and their 
disliked teachers will be penalized unfairly in such a schema.  As a result, tenure and 
salary schedules remain an important part of teacher compensation packages and 
constrain the ability of the administrator to reward or punish differential performance.   
This paper argues that schools, either through pressure from parents, or 
independent behavior of principals, do recognize that teachers are not equally effective.  
Indeed, I argue that current class size reflects past teacher performance.  Using a unique 
data set of teachers matched to students over an eight year period, I can measure teacher 
effectiveness in terms of student performance.  I then consider whether prior teacher 
effectiveness influences current class size.  The results show that class size is influenced 
by prior teacher effectiveness, particularly in lower levels of schooling where there is 
greater substitutability between teachers based on content knowledge. 
Class Size as a Policy Instrument 
 Before discussing the research concerning class size and its potential implications 
for policy, it is important to differentiate between class size and pupil-teacher ratios.  
While some may consider these two measurements to be similar, they are in fact quite 
different.  Pupil-teacher ratios give a comprehensive view of the human resources 
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committed to students’ learning within a school.  However, these expenditures may not 
be directly related to classroom interaction and may include teachers who spend time in 
administrative roles or other support positions (Ehrenberg et al. 2001).  While class size 
does not give a sense of the overall level of resources committed to students, it does 
account for the most important resource, the teacher, and how the teacher's impact may 
be constrained by the number of students with whom they interact.  In an effort to 
identify this relationship and how the number of students in a class may influence 
individual student performance, numerous studies have looked at class size.35  The 
Tennessee STAR experiments are the most prominent of findings in this research area 
(Nye 2000; Finn, Gerber, Achilles, and Boyd-Zaharias 2001; Krueger 2003).  Like the 
effects of other school resources such as expenditure per student and teacher salaries, the 
results are mixed, although significant reductions in class size do appear to increase 
student performance on standardized exams.  For example, a reduction in class size of 
about ten students would lead to gains in student achievement comparable to what could 
be achieved through the improvement of teacher quality by one standard deviation (Nye, 
Hedges, & Konstantopoulos, 2001).  These results are contingent upon the controlled 
environment of the Tennessee STAR experiment and would require a significant 
commitment of resources.   
 Therefore, because districts often cannot commit the resources necessary to affect 
student achievement through class size reductions, perhaps more important for research is 
to establish whether decision makers determine class sizes based upon other factors, 
particularly those associated with the teacher.  Accordingly, for the purpose of this paper, 
                                                          
35 See Hanushek 1997; Hanushek 1999; Krueger 1999. 
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I am not directly interested in whether class size influences student performance.  Rather, 
I want to address whether class size is a policy instrument of principals and school 
administrators more generally.   The remainder of this section of the paper provides a 
conceptual framework for thinking about class size as a reward and/or punishment 
variable for effective and ineffective teaching. 
 As stated above, virtually all stakeholders agree that teacher quality is an 
important input into the education production process.  The importance of enhanced 
teacher quality has grown in recent years with federal and state laws that have increased 
school accountability.  High stakes testing is now a significant part of the K-12 
educational system (Airasian 1988; Dorn 1998; Bracey 2000).  Given this environment, 
principals of schools face increased pressure to produce results and view teachers as a 
significant way to improve the school performance measures.  Because principals face 
constraints such as tenure and salary schedules, they may have few alternatives in 
recognizing effective teaching other than how they choose to allocate students into 
teachers’ classrooms.  Therefore, I suggest that the inability of administrators to exit 
ineffective teachers, or compensate according to performance, leaves them with little 
recourse but how they choose to place students into teachers' classrooms.  This allocation 
can be done based on many factors such as the ability of student and teacher, and/or class 
size.  This paper will focus on class size. 
 From the perspective of an administrator of a school, class size is a policy 
instrument that can be used to reward or punish behavior and, ultimately, to potentially 
influence school performance.  To be able to do this, the administrator must possess 
information that may not be readily available to researchers.  Specifically, I assume the 
 44 
 
administrator can observe quality variance in teachers.  This variance may be 
independent of measurable variables but it is known to the administrator.  It may be 
signaled via parents, via students, via other teachers, or via direct classroom observations.  
The method of signaling quality variance is not critical.  For the purpose of this 
argument, it is important that the administrator can judge the relative effectiveness of a 
teacher within the school. 
  Assuming teacher effectiveness can be observed, the administrator faces two 
choices.  On the one hand, she can place more students in the classroom of the more 
effective teachers.  If increasing class size, in turn, reduces a teacher’s marginal 
effectiveness, the administrator will have an incentive to increase class sizes of the 
relative effective teachers to the point that at the margin, a reduction in the class size of 
the ineffective teachers increases their marginal effectiveness.  In other words, 
administrators have an incentive to change class size so that marginal effectiveness is 
equated across teachers.  If there were no class size effects on teacher effectiveness and 
there were no binding budget or regulatory constraints, administrators would have an 
incentive to increase class sizes of effective teachers and reduce class sizes of ineffective 
teachers so that ultimately, the least effective teachers would not teach.   
 On the other hand, administrators may also wish to use class size as a source of 
compensation for teachers.  Because salary schedules are typically fixed and tied to 
degree and experience, reducing class size may be one of the ways in which 
administrators can reward the more effective teachers.  Under this scenario, I should 
observe smaller classes for the most effective teachers and larger class sizes for the least 
effective teachers.   
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 A priori, it is not clear which of the above incentives is stronger from an 
administrator’s perspective or whether they balance one another so that there is no 
relationship at all between current class size and past teacher effectiveness.  The next 
section of the paper presents an empirical framework for testing the potential 
relationship. 
Empirical Framework for Estimating Teacher Effectiveness 
 If one wishes to assess whether administrators are determining class sizes based 
upon a teacher's effectiveness, it is essential to define and measure what is meant by 
effective teaching.36  However, accomplishing this task empirically has proven quite 
challenging.  As mentioned previously, the findings on the effects of measureable teacher 
characteristics on student achievement have shown mixed results.  One potential 
explanation is that most of the divergent findings on measureable characteristics stem 
from the differences in empirical methods that have been employed, and especially how 
researchers correct for possible bias and selection issues between students, teachers and 
schools.  Early studies suffered from a failure to account for neighborhood selection 
effects and how they might affect school and teacher covariates.  As a result, these 
studies suggest that teachers and schools matter very little.  Factors such as teacher 
experience, educational attainment and salary were found to have no statistically 
significant relationship with student outcomes.   
                                                          
36 Although I understand that there are many ways to define teaching effectiveness, I 
assume for the purpose of this paper that effective teaching is the ability to influence 
student test scores. 
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Researchers have attempted to correct for potential confoundedness between 
students and their teachers and schools by using value added models.  These studies use 
prior achievement to account for family factors which may influence student 
achievement.  Although the methodology is similar between these studies, the findings on 
teacher characteristics and their relation to student achievement have shown varied 
results (Murnane and Phillips 1981; Goldhaber and Brewer 2000; Clotfelter et al. 2007; 
Harris and Sass 2007; Boyd et al. 2009).  Perhaps the only consistent finding is that 
teacher experience matters in the first few years of teaching.  These teachers have a 
negative effect on their students’ achievement as compared to those teachers that have at 
least three years of experience, all else equal.  However, some research has found that the 
negative effects of new teachers can be offset by the quality of undergraduate field work.  
Studies assessing the further effects of a teacher’s undergraduate experience and the 
effect of additional education such as a Master’s degree have failed to establish any 
consistent relationship with student outcomes. 
 The inability to establish causal relationships between teachers and their students’ 
outcomes goes against conventionally held societal beliefs.  There are two potential 
factors that could cause these findings.  The first is that teachers have no systematic 
impact on student achievement.  The second is that measured and compensated 
characteristics do not capture teacher quality.  Assuming that the latter is true, I am left to 
account for teacher impacts based on unobserved or unmeasured characteristics.  
Methodologically I am attempting to estimate the deviations from mean student 
achievement by teacher over time while accounting for all other factors I believe impact 
student outcomes.  I expect that the variation in these deviations is not random between 
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teachers, but rather fixed on their unobservable characteristics.  These fixed effects are 
then attributed to the teacher as a measure of effectiveness.  Many studies have 
established that these fixed effects are significant and can explain anywhere from 7% to 
21% of the variation in student outcomes (Rivkin, et al., 2005).  In this way, the research 
has established that teachers matter, but not how they matter.      
The teacher fixed effect accounts for the average impact of unobservable fixed 
teacher characteristics on student achievement over time.  For example, I assume that a 
teacher with a high level of motivation, which is unobserved, will have a larger positive 
impact on her students’ achievement than a teacher with a lower level of motivation.  
However, I suspect that context matters for these fixed effects.  Indeed, recent evidence 
finds that teacher fixed effects are more pronounced in smaller classes with low achievers 
(Konstantopoulos and Sun 2010).  Consider again the teacher with a high level of 
motivation.  I suggest that the impact of this unobserved characteristic will function 
differently, all else equal, in a class of 5 students as opposed to a class of 40 students.  If I 
assume that class size is randomly determined, this assertion does not matter.  However, I 
am explicitly assuming that class size may be related to past teaching effectiveness.  If 
there is indeed a relationship between past effectiveness and current class size, an 
empirical model which uses the entire panel to generate the fixed effects would be subject 
to selection bias.  In other words, class size would be endogenous to teacher 
effectiveness.  To account for this change in context and the potential endogeneity 
between teaching effectiveness and class size, I cannot use current or future teacher 
effectiveness estimates.  Instead, I use the panel for the years prior to the current year to 
generate a teacher effectiveness measure.  Therefore, if I want to predict class size in year 
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t, I use the panel from year 1 to year t-1 to generate teacher fixed effects.37  In order to 
generate reliable measures of the iterated fixed effect, I use the first three years of data to 
estimate the first iteration, and then add an additional year for each subsequent iteration.   
Data 
 The remainder of this paper will provide an analysis of teacher fixed effects and 
their relation to class size using individual student-teacher level observations from ten 
Kentucky school districts for the school years 2000-2001 through 2007-2008.38  Because 
Kentucky lacks a system that allows students to be matched to their teachers over time, 
roster data was obtained directly from the school districts which are located in central and 
eastern Kentucky.39  The roster data include the school year, the name and section of the 
math course, the teacher for that section, and all students enrolled in that section.  The 
ability to match students to teachers varies by district over the sample period as some 
districts retained data for longer periods.  Therefore, the data set is a mixed panel.  The 
roster files were then matched to several state-level administrative data bases.  Because 
Kentucky does not use common identifiers for students and teachers, much of the 
matching required name and birth date or other person-specific characteristics.  Included 
in these data bases are student characteristics and testing data, teacher characteristics and 
credentials, as well as school level data.  The matched data set used for the following 
analysis allows observations of each student who tested in math in a given year for which 
I can identify the teacher who taught his or her math class. Table 3.2 provides descriptive 
statistics for students, teachers and schools in the ten districts used for the analysis.  The  
                                                          
37 I will refer to this measure as an iterated fixed effect. 
38 The data were compiled as part of an evaluation project sponsored by NSF. 
39 Table 3.1 provides data for the districts used in this analysis.  
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Table 3.1: District Locale, Total Students and Number of Schools by Type of School 
 
statistics vary by year, therefore Table 3.2 presents the school year 2004-2005 as a 
representative year.   
 Beyond the logistical issues associated with data collection, the use of the 
Kentucky data also required reconciliation of multiple testing instruments because testing 
in Kentucky has undergone significant changes within the sample years of the data.  
From the 2000-2001 to the 2005-2006 school years, the state math test covered grades 5,  
 
District 
Urban-
Centric 
Locale 
Total 
Students 
2007-2008 
Primary 
Schools 
Middle 
Schools 
High 
Schools 
Other 
Schools 
Kentucky1 Rural: Distant 1,234 3 1 1 0 
Kentucky2 Rural: Distant 3,119 6 2 2 0 
Kentucky3 Rural: Fringe 2,196 3 1 1 0 
Kentucky4 City: Large 24,134 35 12 5 3 
Kentucky5 Town: Distant 2,399 3 1 1 0 
Kentucky6 Town: Distant 1,606 3 1 1 0 
Kentucky7 Rural: Remote 1,133 4 1 1 0 
Kentucky8 Rural: Remote 2,105 6 1 1 0 
Kentucky9 Rural: Distant 9,743 17 4 5 2 
Kentucky10 Suburb: Mid 663 1 2 1 0 
Total  48,332 81 26 19 5 
Kentucky 2: missing vocational high school 
Kentucky 3: missing one primary school one year, school switched to PK and K. 
Kentucky 4: there are additional vocational and alternative schools for which I did not receive data. 
Kentucky 5: missing 2001-2002 data for all primary schools. 
Kentucky 9: name/location change 15 elementary schools over all years;  name/location change 3 
schools over all years 
Kentucky 8: missing 2003 data for middle schools 
Kentucky 10: primary available 2006-2008; middle school available 2004-2007; high school 
available 2004-2005, 2007-2008 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for a selective sample in 2005 for grades 5, 8, and 11 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Free and Reduced Price Lunch 11,929 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Female 11,695 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Asian 11,715 0.02 0.12 0 1 
Black 11,715 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Hispanic 11,715 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Native American 11,715 <0.00 0.01 0 1 
Other 11,715 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Avg. Experience (School) 11,929 12.30 2.10 5.3 17.7 
Enrollment 11,929 681.94 423.17 80 2,062 
Percent Masters’ Degree 11,929 76.09 11.26 35 100 
Percent Free and Reduced  11,929 0.51 0.212 0 .97 
Expenditure per Student 11,929 5,708.21 1,208.24 3,908 12,837 
Student Teacher Ratio 11,929 15.15 2.38 8 22 
Student Computer Ratio 11,929 4.01 1.28 1.6 7.6 
Math Index 11,929 71.52 12.35 41.97 112.69 
Experience 11,929 12.085 8.973 0 34 
Experience Squared 11,929 226.552 269.009 0 1,156 
Highest Degree1 11,929 3.083 1.301 1 7 
1 – Highest degree coded as follows: 1=Bachelor’s, 2=5th year, 3=Planned 6th year, 4=Master’s, 5=Rank I, 6=Specialist, 7=Doctorate 
 
8, and 11.  Nationally standardized tests (the CTBS) were also administered in math to 
students in grades 3, 6, and 9 over the same years.  Most recently, in 2007 the state 
administered the state test in grades 3 through 9 and grade 11, and changed the test so 
that the scale of score in years prior cannot reliably be reconciled with those of 2007 and 
onward.40   In addition, each grade level test involves scores with different scales.  For 
example, a 500 on a math test of a 5th grader was not designed to be equivalent to a 500 
on the math test of an 8th grader.  Changes in the testing intervals and scales were also 
present in the state reading and science tests.  From 2000-2001 through 2005-2006 the 
state reading test was administered in grades 4,7, and 10, and the state science test was 
administered in grades 4,7, and 11.  Beginning in 2006-2007, the reading test was 
                                                          
40 This conclusion has been affirmed by officials of the Kentucky Department of 
Education. 
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administered in grades 3 through 8 and in grade 10.  Like the math test, the scales of the 
reading and science exams also changed in 2006-2007 so that scores cannot be 
reconciled.  I use the reading and science tests as controls for prior achievement. 41     
 Given the changing scale of the test score data over the time period I observe, the 
use of standardized test scores as variables (as in a standard value-added model) is 
somewhat problematic for estimating the effectiveness of teachers and its subsequent 
relationship with class size.  Ballou (2009) summarizes the many issues associated with 
scaling and the use of standardized test scores.   Because changing scales make increases 
and decreases in scores difficult to interpret, I do not use the scores as the dependent 
variable.  Instead, to mitigate the test score issues, I convert the Kentucky standardized 
exam scores to ranks.  Ranks are well defined for any scale and comparable as long as the 
tests have validity for the same ability measure—math, science, or reading, in the present 
case.  Students’ ranks on scores have been used recently by Arcidiacono (2004; 2005) 
and Betebenner (2009), and they have an advantage over test scores (raw or scaled) in 
that no attempt is made to compare the meaning of a unit change in score.   The rankings, 
on the other hand, imply that I cannot link teacher effectiveness to a quantitative measure 
of student learning by using units of change in test scores.   
 Because I use ranks from the standardized exams rather than the scores, it is 
useful to discuss the rank data a bit further.  I rank students on their performance on the 
                                                          
41 I use all prior test scores on math, science, and reading because of the interval timing 
of these tests in Kentucky.  Note that the lagged test score could be one to two years 
earlier depending on the subject tested. Of great interest, the correlation coefficients on 
student ranks are remarkably similar across the 3 subject areas.  For example, 8th grade 
math ranks across the panel have a correlation coefficient of 0.56 with the prior math test, 
0.54 with the most recent reading exam, and 0.58 with the lagged science exam.  Recall, 
that through 2006, math was tested in grades 5, 8, and 11.  After 2006, the test is annual.  
See McCafferty et. al. (2003) for discussion of the usage of multiple subject area tests. 
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state tests in math, science, and reading although I am using only the first one as a 
dependent variable.    The summary statistics for rank are not useful, because ranks (in 
descending order in this example) are fixed numbers from n, the total number of students 
taking the test in that grade level each year, down to 1.  To compute the ranks, I grouped 
all students taking a particular grade-relevant exam per year. 42  For example, all students 
in the sample who participated in the math exam in the eighth grade for school year 2006-
07 were ranked together.  I did not cross subject exam, grade levels, or years in ranking 
the students.43   
Model and Results 
Before discussing the model and results, I address the technical aspects of the 
estimation of class size which motivated the empirical methods used.  Conceptually, I 
expect that class size can be influenced by three main factors, average in-class 
characteristics of the students, school characteristics and teacher characteristics, and can 
be estimated by the following equation:  
(1)   𝐶𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖 
where 𝐶 is the number of students in class 𝑖 and the 𝛽𝑖′𝑠 are the estimated coefficients.  𝑃 
is a vector of the average student characteristics of class 𝑖.   𝑆 describes a vector of the 
characteristics of the school for which class 𝑖 is located.  A vector of characteristics of the 
                                                          
42 Ranking was conducted using the mean rank method where the mean of the sample is 
equal to (n+1)/2.  This method assigns the same average rank to students with the same 
score.  For example, if three students have the same score and account for the 2nd, 3rd 
and 4th to last ranks, they would each be given the average rank of 3.   
43 I also transformed the scaled scores into z-scores by subject and cohort.  The results of 
the following analysis of class size using z-scores are presented in Appendix B. 
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teacher for class  𝑖 is represented by 𝑇, and that teacher’s past effectiveness is accounted 
for by 𝐸.  While most of the explanatory variables are easily accounted for, controlling 
for teacher effectiveness presents some difficulty.  As mentioned previously, typically 
measured teacher characteristics are generally found to be unrelated to effective teaching.  
Accordingly, to generate such a measure, a student achievement model using teacher 
fixed effects was estimated.      
Using the individually matched student-teacher level data, student achievement 
was estimated in order to generate the teacher fixed effects.  The model is as follows: 
(2)   𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝑐𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   
where 𝑅 is the relative ranking of student 𝑖 within the sample of students in the same 
grade that took the standardized math exam in year 𝑡 and the 𝛽𝑖′𝑠 are the estimated 
coefficients.  The rankings are a function of the same student’s rankings on the most 
recent prior test in math as well as reading and science.  If the most recent test was a 
nationally standardized math test (CTBS) rather than the state test, I used ranks on that 
test as a control variable.  A vector of variables 𝑃, describes the characteristics of 
student 𝑖 in year 𝑡.  𝑇 is a vector of student 𝑖’s math teacher’s experience and degree in 
year 𝑡.  𝑆 is a vector of school characteristics for student 𝑖 in year 𝑡 for which the student-
teacher combination is observed.   The term, θ𝑗, represents a teacher fixed effect for 
teacher  𝑗, 𝑐𝑗 is the teacher-clustered error term, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error.   
Estimation of equation (2) yields a predicted ranking, 𝑅�𝑖𝑡 for each student that is 
based on that student’s own demographics, past test performance, the student’s teacher, 
and his or her school attended.  To develop a measure of teacher effectiveness, I 
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estimated this equation for each school year 2003 through 2008.44  In the estimation, the 
current year as well as all preceding years are included to generate an estimate of the 
predicted student rank and, for my purpose, a teacher fixed effect.  For example, in year 
𝑡, the estimated fixed effect for a given teacher 𝑗 is the average effect of the unobservable 
characteristics of teacher 𝑗 from 2000-01 through year t.  This measure of teacher 
effectiveness is then used to predict class size in year 𝑡+1. 
Consistent with the theory that actors within the school may be adjusting class 
sizes according to variation of within school teaching effectiveness, equation (1) was re-
specified as a school fixed effects model.  This also allows me to account for potential 
heterogeneity in the pooled-OLS model as it is likely that the error term is correlated with 
the regressors.  The model is as follows:45 
(3)   𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑘 + 𝑐𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡       
where 𝐶 is the number of students in class 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 𝑃 is a vector of the average student 
characteristics for class 𝑖 in year 𝑡.  𝑆 is a vector of time varying school characteristics for 
year 𝑡 for which the class is located.  Teacher characteristics for class 𝑖 year 𝑡 are 
represented by the vector 𝑇.  Past teacher effectiveness for teacher 𝑗 in class 𝑖 year 𝑡-1 
which was generated from equation (2) is denoted by 𝐸.  𝜃𝑘 represents the school fixed 
effect for school 𝑘,  𝑐𝑘 is the school-clustered error term, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic 
error.         
                                                          
44 I use the first three years of data to generate reliable estimates of teacher effectiveness.     
45 Recall that those responding to teacher effectiveness through class size can include 
administrators, parents or students. 
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 Given the theoretical importance of teacher effectiveness for the specification of 
equations (1) and (3) I will first discuss the results from equation (2), the estimation of 
student rankings with teacher fixed effects.46   Consistent with those factors which 
influence student achievement, I include variables within the categories of student, school 
and teacher.47  Considering first student level characteristics, one can see in Table 3.3 
that, consistent with the findings in the literature, the previous achievement of a student 
in all subjects is highly predictive of current achievement in math in all grade levels.  The 
sign is consistent with what one would expect.  If a student performs relatively worse on 
a previous test as compared to his peers, he can expect to have a worse ranking in the 
current period.  Students that have a lower socioeconomic family status, as indicated by 
whether or not they are eligible for free and reduced price lunch, have a worse ranking on 
the math exam than their peers.  This relationship is consistent across all grade levels, 
although its magnitude diminishes as grade level increases.  In all grades, females have a 
lower expected ranking than their male counterparts.  In all grade levels, Asian students 
perform significantly better than White students, while Black and Hispanic students 
perform worse.  Native American students perform worse relative to white students in 8th 
and 11th grade, while students with an ethnicity designated as other perform worse in 8th 
grade.  
  
  
                                                          
46 Note that the ranking of student performance is in descending order with one being the 
worst. 
47 Equation 2 was estimated for each panel group from the base year 2000-2001 to 200x-
200x+1 where x = (3, 4, 5, 6, 7) to generate the iterated fixed effects.  Table 3 displays 
the results from the entire panel, 2000-01 to 2007-2008. 
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Table 3.3: Student Achievement with Teacher Fixed Effects (00-08) 
  
Independent Variables Grade 5  Grade 8 Grade 11 
Math Rank Lagged 0.369 *** 0.476 *** 0.433 *** 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.014) 
 Science Rank Lagged 0.224 *** 0.224 *** 0.274 *** 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 Reading Rank Lagged  0.255 *** 0.193 *** 0.099 *** 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
    Student Characteristics 
      Free and Reduced Price (FRP) Lunch -246.370 *** -188.627 *** -65.668 *** 
 
(20.510) 
 
(17.516) 
 
(13.003) 
 Female -34.783 ** -54.732 *** -58.272 *** 
 
(15.957) 
 
(12.029) 
 
(10,737) 
 Asian 460.173 *** 586.069 *** 386.307 *** 
 
(56.740) 
 
(47.091) 
 
(47.426) 
 Black -292.138 *** -318.987 *** -263.128 *** 
 
(26.667) 
 
(22.748) 
 
(19.276) 
 Hispanic -124.143 *** -178.853 *** -233.565 *** 
 
(44.062) 
 
(39.535) 
 
(45.952) 
 Native American 239.453 
 
-558.093 ** -477.576 ** 
 
(264.329) 
 
(228.737) 
 
(200.553) 
 Other -39.347 
 
115.232 ** -48.399 
 
 
(73.329) 
 
(58.761) 
 
(61.212) 
    School Characteristics 
      Class Size 2.794 ** 0.221
 
-1.243
 
 
(1.327) 
 
(1.298) 
 
(1.426) 
 Average Experience -7.567 
 
-10.725 
 
16.886 ** 
 
(12.236) 
 
(9.957) 
 
(8.422) 
 Enrollment 0.086 
 
0.102 * 0.047 
 
 
(0.89) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.044) 
 Percent Master's -0.657 
 
2.347 ** -3.478 *** 
 
(0.820) 
 
(1.034) 
 
(0.994) 
 Percent of FRP Students 92.872 
 
8.342 
 
-237.259 
 
 
(63.310) 
 
(62.673) 
 
(59.490) 
 Expenditure per Student 0.006 
 
0.029 * 0.014 
 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.020) 
 Student-Teacher Ratio -0.792 
 
-15.621 * -10.018 
 
 
(10.123) 
 
(9.422) 
 
(6.855) 
 Student-Computer Ratio -3.466 
 
6.842 
 
-1.284 
 
 
(9.185) 
 
(7.257) 
 
(4.528) 
 Math Index 0.829 
 
2.904 *** 3.150 ** 
 
(0.883) 
 
(0.875) 
 
(1.278) 
    Teacher Characteristics 
      Highest Degree Obtained -35.181
 
14.578
 
34.481 * 
 
(31.330) 
 
(21.546) 
 
(18.059) 
 Experience 4-7 Years -223.132 ** -110.904 
 
96.746 ** 
 
(105.680) 
 
(72.339) 
 
(42.324) 
 Experience 8-12 Years -196.710 ** -112.714 
 
33.986 
 
 
(98.659) 
 
(81.555) 
 
(53.861) 
 Experience 13-17 Years -332.442 *** -96.951 
 
63.302 
 
 
(124.589) 
 
(99.846) 
 
(64.209) 
 Experience 18 Years and Higher -436.147 *** -70.630 
 
74.983 
 
 
(144.120) 
 
(100.205) 
 
(73.347) 
 N 22,859   27,952   18,009   
F-Test  481.99 *** 977.68 ***  545.29 ***  
Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses are presented in the table. 
*indicates 0.10 level of significance ** indicates 0.05 level of significance, *** indicates 0.01 level of significance 
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 Certain school level characteristics are also important in explaining current 
student performance. A school's math index is positively associated with student 
achievement in the 8th and 11th grade.  Class size and the average experience level of 
teachers in the school have a statistically significant impact on student achievement in the 
5th and 11th grade respectively.  School enrollment is statistically significant in the 8th 
grade and suggests that students in larger schools perform better than students in schools 
with lower enrollments.  The percentage of teachers that hold a master’s degree has an 
unfavorable impact on student achievement in 11th grade, but has a favorable impact in 
8th grade.  Students who attend schools with higher percentages of FRP students do not 
have statistically different achievement than their counterparts.  Expenditure per student 
is only statistically significant in the 8th, implying that higher expenditures lead to better 
student performance.  Student-teacher ratio is statistically significant in the 8th grade, 
suggesting that increased ratios are associated with worse performance.  Student-
computer ratios do not have a statistically significant influence on student achievement at 
any grade level.  
 For the purpose of this paper, the primary intention of estimating this equation 
was to generate the teacher fixed effects.48  First note that the observable teacher 
characteristics, experience and highest degree obtained, are unrelated to student 
achievement in all grade levels.  The teacher fixed effects, however, explain a significant 
portion of the variance in student achievement.  The fixed effects explain a low of 32  
 
 
                                                          
48 The summary statistics for the fixed effects vary by iteration.  They are reported in 
Table 2 for the entire panel.  A teacher with a positive fixed effect has a favorable 
influence on their students by improving their relative ranking.   
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Table 3.4: Predicted Class Size (pooled-OLS) 
 
*indicates 0.10 level of significance, **indicates 0.05 level of significance, *** indicates 0.01 level of significance 
 
percent of the variation in 8th grade, 34 percent of the variation in 5th grade and a high of 
43 percent in 11th grade.  These results are consistent with the findings of Rivkin, 
Hanushek, and Kain (2005), and supported by others, that teachers matter in ways that 
are not always observable.  
 
Coefficients  
(robust std. errors) 
Coefficients  
(robust std. errors) 
Coefficients  
(robust std. errors) 
Independent Variables Grade 5 Grade 8 Grade 11 
Teacher Characteristics    
Past Effectiveness 0.0003 (0.0003) 
      0.0021*** 
(0.0008) 
     0.0017** 
(0.0008) 
Experience  -0.0132 (0.0264) 
 0.0765* 
(0.0408) 
-0.0018 
(0.0292) 
Highest Degree Obtained -0.2318 (0.2067) 
   0.5119** 
(0.2440) 
0.5391* 
(0.2836) 
Classroom Characteristics 
 
  
Math rank lag -0.0016 (0.0010) 
0.0013 
(0.0013) 
0.0012 
(0.0012) 
Science rank lag -0.0002 (0.0009) 
-0.0017* 
(0.0010) 
-0.0002 
(0.0012) 
Reading rank lag 0.0006 (0.0009) 
-0.0010 
(0.0014) 
-0.0009 
(0.0008) 
Free and Reduced Price 
(FRP)Lunch  
3.855* 
(2.047) 
-2.070 
(1.971) 
-4.186* 
(2.306) 
Asian -1.838 (4.510) 
17.155 
(19.020) 
-8.613 
(6.583) 
Black -0.6768 (1.954) 
-7.957** 
(3.472) 
-13.036*** 
(2.977) 
Hispanic -11.673*** (3.558) 
-0.9724 
(7.690) 
33.377** 
(16.517) 
Native American 2.996 (25.041) 
400.830*** 
(75.420) 
171.800 
(114.808) 
Other -4.245 (6.539) 
-2.292 
(13.673) 
5.674 
(17.910) 
School Characteristics 
 
  
Expenditure per student -0.0003*** (0.0001) 
-0.0011*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004 
(0.0004) 
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.1456** (0.0640) 
0.4770*** 
(0.1171) 
0.1131 
(0.1092) 
Math Index Lag 0.0185 (0.0139) 
0.0277 
(0.0264) 
0.0712*** 
(0.0258) 
Appalachia 4.268*** (1.383) 
5.451*** 
(1.913) 
1.911 
(1.749) 
N  
R-Squared 
937  
0.0513 
633  
0.1406 
735  
0.1062 
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 Using the measure of past effectiveness generated from the fixed effects model, 
the two class size models were then estimated.  I present first, in Table 3.4, the results of 
class size predicted from the pooled-OLS model.49  In interpreting these results, it is 
important to consider that this specification accounts for both across and within school 
variation. The variable of greatest interest is the lagged fixed effect, or past teacher 
effectiveness.  In both 8th and 11th grade there is a statistically significant relationship 
between class size and past teacher effectiveness.  More effective teaching in prior 
periods is associated with larger current class size, although the magnitude is small.50  
More specifically, a teacher that performs one standard deviation better than the average 
teacher can expect to have approximately one more student in her classroom.  More 
experienced teachers have larger classrooms in 8th grade, while teachers with better 
credentials have larger classrooms in grades 8 and 11.  The average number of eligible 
FRP students has a positive impact on class size in 5th grade but a negative impact on 
class size in grade 11.  The average number of Black students is associated with smaller 
classes in grades 8 and 11.  Greater percentages of Hispanic students in a class are 
associated with smaller classes in grade 5, but larger classes in grade 11 and higher 
Native American percentages are positively related to class size in grade 8.  Expenditure 
per student is negatively related to class size in 5th and 8th grade.  Student-teacher ratios 
are significant and negatively related to class size in 5th grade, significant and positively 
related to class size in 8th grade, and unrelated to class size in 11th grade.  This is 
consistent with the notion that the two measures are conceptually different from one 
another as asserted earlier in the paper.  The lagged performance of the school as 
                                                          
49 The classroom characteristics are averages. 
50 Recall again that ranks are in descending order with one being worse-performing.  
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measured by their math index is significant at the high school level and suggests that 
schools that have better performance last year have larger classes this year.  Finally, 
schools in Appalachia have larger classes in the 5th and 8th grades.   
 Although these results are suggestive, the pooled-OLS accounts for both across 
and within school variation.  Therefore, it is important to note that they may be sensitive 
to the specification of the model.  The results of the estimation for class size in the school 
fixed effects model present a somewhat different picture than those of the pooled-OLS, as 
this specification accounts for only the within school variation.  Though this is not 
surprising, and is consistent with my theory that because of tenure and salary constraints 
within the school, all else equal, administrators determine class size according to within 
school variation in past teaching effectiveness.   
 The results of the school fixed effects estimation of class size are presented in 
Table 3.5.  The variable of interest, past teaching effectiveness, is statistically significant 
in the 5th and 8th grades.  The signs of the two coefficients indicate that teachers who 
had a positive impact on their past students' performance, in terms of improving their 
relative ranking, have larger class sizes in the current year.  The only other significant 
teacher level characteristic is highest degree for 8th grade teachers, indicating that 
teachers with higher credentials have more students.  The average classroom 
characteristics related to class size are the lagged reading rank, free and reduced price 
lunch percentage and the percentage of Native American students.  In grade 8, on 
average, classes with better reading performance as measured by their past reading rank, 
have larger classes.  In grades 8 and 11, classes with a higher percentage of free and 
reduced price lunch students are smaller.  Also in grades 8 and 11, classes with higher  
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Table 3.5: Predicted Class Size (School Fixed Effects) 
 
*indicates 0.10 level of significance, **indicates 0.05 level of significance, *** indicates 0.01 level of significance 
 
percentages of Native American students are larger.  Finally, expenditure per student and 
past school math performance are significant in the 5th grade.  At this level, higher 
school per student expenditure in the current year than other years, on average, is related 
to smaller classes.  These schools also have smaller classes if they performed relatively 
worse in the previous year than other years.                              
 
Coefficients  
(robust std. errors) 
Coefficients  
(robust std. errors) 
Coefficients  
(robust std. errors) 
Independent Variables Grade 5 Grade 8 Grade 11 
Teacher Characteristics    
Past Effectiveness     0.0008** (0.0003) 
    0.0015** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0012 
(0.0012) 
Experience  -0.0239 (0.0256) 
0.0464 
(0.0409) 
-0.0184 
(0.0298) 
Highest Degree Obtained -0.0567 (0.1840) 
0.5610** 
(0.2544) 
0.5384 
(0.4879) 
Classroom Characteristics 
 
  
Math rank lag -0.0016 (0.0010) 
0.0020 
(0.0015) 
-0.0001 
(0.0013) 
Science rank lag 0.0003 (0.0007) 
-0.0011 
(0.0014) 
0.0002 
(0.0014) 
Reading rank lag -0.0003 (0.0008) 
-0.0028** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0006 
(0.0007) 
Free and Reduced Price 
(FRP)Lunch  
-1.528 
(2.923) 
-9.210* 
(5.293) 
-5.489* 
(3.139) 
Asian 1.286 (5.538) 
22.415 
(26.084) 
-8.054 
(9.796) 
Black 4.901 (3.189) 
3.727 
(7.697) 
-6.053 
(4.230) 
Hispanic -4.337 (4.779) 
5.642 
(11.597) 
39.544 
(26.783) 
Native American 16.188 (24.986) 
298.240*** 
(106.953) 
142.189* 
(72.199) 
Other -3.527 (8.761) 
7.669 
(14.347) 
15.693 
(23.495) 
School Characteristics 
 
  
Expenditure per student -0.0004*** (0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0005) 
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.1631 (0.1062) 
0.0649 
(0.1564) 
-0.0925 
(0.1622) 
Math Index Lag 0.0449* (0.0237) 
-0.0235 
(0.0435) 
-0.0132 
(0.0371) 
N 
R-Squared 
937 
0.0589 
633  
0.1216 
735  
0.0837 
Fraction of Variance 0.733 0.417 0.169 
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 Because the effects of past teaching effectiveness on class size change somewhat 
depending on how the model is specified, it is helpful to offer a potential explanation for 
why I may expect to see this.  The remaining part of this section presents a conceptual 
hypothesis of how an administrator may face additional constraints which may prevent 
her from determining class sizes based upon past teaching effectiveness due to a lack of 
alternative teachers.  Certainly I am concerned with past effectiveness, but teachers also 
provide content specific knowledge or field expertise.  So for simplicity, I can assume 
that teacher demand, measured by their class size, can be defined by how effective they 
are in the classroom, as measured by their ability to influence student outcomes, and the 
content knowledge demands of their area of expertise.  For example, in 11th grade there is 
a relationship between past teacher effectiveness and current class size across the sample 
in the OLS model, suggesting that teachers who are better than the average teacher in the 
sample have classes with more students.  However, it is not clear whether or not this is 
due to overall teacher quality and curriculum differences between schools.  In other 
words, this may be reflective of a distributional effect as some schools may have better 
teachers on average as well as higher demand for the classes they teach.  Consider the 
results of the school fixed effects model for grade 11.  Past effectiveness is no longer 
significant in explaining the variation in class size within the school.  This may be due to 
the fact that as grade level increases so too does the rigor of the curriculum and the level 
of content knowledge needed by the teacher.  Accordingly, there may be only one teacher 
qualified to teach a certain subject.  In this respect, it may be that the area of expertise 
and the number of students taking the course dominate the consideration of past teaching 
effectiveness.   
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 Conversely, the results for the grade 5 models suggest that past effectiveness may 
be more important than content expertise in elementary school.  Consider first the results 
from the OLS estimation.  Class size is unrelated to past effectiveness.  Once again, it is 
not clear that this is due to an absence of a relationship between past teacher effectiveness 
and class size, or simply reflective of the distribution of effective teachers across schools.  
What is perhaps more illuminating is that there is a significant relationship to within 
school differences in past teaching effectiveness and class size.  In the school fixed 
effects model, a teacher that is more effective than her colleagues within the school has a 
larger class, although the magnitude is small.  It can be argued that the content 
knowledge or expertise demands for an elementary teacher are less than that of their high 
school counterparts.  Therefore, all teachers are qualified to teach the curriculum and 
there is a greater opportunity for substitutability between teachers based on past 
effectiveness thereby generating the significant relationship between past effectiveness 
and class size in the fixed effects model.  These inferences are strengthened by the results 
of the class size estimations for grade 8.  One could argue that the content knowledge 
demands for these teachers are greater than that of their elementary counterparts but less 
than that of their high school counterparts.  As such there may be both distributional 
effects as well as within school effects between past effectiveness and class size.  Similar 
to the results from the grade 11 OLS model, there may be teacher effectiveness and 
curriculum distributional differences across schools.  However, the school fixed effects 
model suggests that there is a within school relationship between past effectiveness and 
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class size.  This suggests that at the middle school level, content knowledge is important, 
but it is not as exclusive and there may still be an opportunity for administrators to 
substitute one teacher for another based on differences in past effectiveness.  
 Consider finally the differences in the fraction of variance of the error term due to 
the fixed effect.  The large percentage at the elementary level suggests that there is more 
that schools can do at this level to affect class size.  However this ability diminishes as 
grade level increases so that by grade 11 the ability of schools to affect class size 
becomes minimal.  Therefore, schools may be able to do less at the margin as school 
level increases.  Although I cannot definitively conclude that my hypothesis is supported 
through the findings in this paper, the results are suggestive and provide an opportunity 
for future research.       
Conclusions and Implications  
 School administrators are accountable for numerous tasks.  Arguably, the most 
significant of these is how their schools perform.  If we believe that teachers are the most 
important school level resource affecting this performance, then how the administrator 
manages this resource is critical.  However, the ability of the administrator to reward or 
punish differential performance is limited due to tenure and salary schedule constraints.  
Therefore, they have an incentive to employ methods which can work under the current 
system.  One possible strategy is the use of class size. 
 While there has been significant scholarly effort focusing on the effects of class 
size, to my knowledge there has been no research evaluating how class size can be used 
as an instrument of the school in recognizing teacher performance.  At the outset of this 
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paper I suggested that a priori it is not clear if class size is used as a tool to try to equalize 
the marginal impacts of teachers, a tool to reward teaching effectiveness or unrelated to 
teacher performance.  The results indicate that schools, whether it be through 
administrators, parents, other teachers and/or students, do recognize variations in teacher 
performance and overall, classrooms of the more effective teachers are larger. 
 While this paper examined the choice of class size by the administrator, one 
possible extension of this research is to explore the possibility of a subsequent response 
by more effective teachers in the long run.  Allgood and Rice (2002) found evidence that 
turnover rates are higher in lower income, lower achieving schools, and as Figlio (1997) 
finds, higher quality teachers tend to command higher salaries that affluent districts are 
more willing to pay.   Although much needs to be done, one possible explanation is that 
the larger class sizes of more effective teachers in lower performing schools coupled with 
lower compensation may motivate exit, particularly if they can command higher salaries 
in other schools with teachers of similar quality.    
 Finally, I offer a conceptual hypothesis for the somewhat different findings of the 
two models used to predict class size.  Conceptually, the notion of substitutability 
between teachers provides an alternative way to define teacher quality.  At the beginning 
of this paper I explicitly assumed that teacher quality is defined as the impact a teacher 
has on student outcomes.  It may be that along with this impact, the content knowledge of 
the teacher could also be considered.  Indeed, if the content knowledge of the teacher is 
unmatched within the school, this should be considered as a part of the quality of the 
teacher.  However, I cannot definitively state that this is the case, nevertheless this 
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provides an interesting avenue for research concerning the various constraints that school 
administrators face and how those constraints influence their choices.              
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CHAPTER 4 
CONTINGENCY FUNDS IN KENTUCKY: ARE SCHOOLS RESPONDING TO 
BUDGET UNCERTAINTY? 
Introduction 
 Academic research focused on school finance has been primarily concerned with 
two issues; the effect of school resources on student achievement and the equity of access 
to those resources across school districts.   Nestled within these two broad literatures is 
the role of the budgeting process.  Much has been said about equity and how districts 
choose to expend their budgets.  However, research has had little to say about how 
districts choose not to expend their budgets.  More formally, why do some districts 
choose to save money in contingency or "rainy day" funds?  If they do save money, how 
do they determine the fund level?  Is it a function of the characteristics of their students 
and sponsors, or a function of the preferences of the superintendent or principal?  Finally, 
is this efficient in the sense that it makes these school districts better able to accomplish 
the various wants of their sponsors over time?51  While educational contingency funds 
have been a topic in the popular press, the academic literature has yet to analyze them.  
The focus of this analysis will address only the influencing factors of contingency funds, 
although it is also the intention of this research to begin a discourse on a topic that has far 
reaching school finance implications and many unanswered questions.   
 
 
                                                          
51 In this case, sponsors are the state, parents, and general public. 
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Contingency Funds in Education   
 Much of the literature pertaining to contingency or rainy day funds in the public 
sector evaluates their role at the state level (Pollock & Suyderhoud, 1986; Joyce, 2001; 
Cornia &Nelson, 2003).52 This research has been primarily concerned with estimating the 
optimal size of contingency funds for which the explicit function is managing revenue 
shortfalls during economic downturns.53  Contingency funds provide needed flexibility in 
the budgeting process because often times revenue shortfalls are not discovered until well 
after the fiscal year begins and because all but one state, either by constitutional or 
statutory requirement, must have revenues that meet or exceed expenditures.54  Rather 
than using politically unpopular and administratively costly tax increases or expenditure 
cuts, contingency funds provide an alternate means of addressing budgetary shortfalls.  
Contingency funds represent sacrificed expenditure during periods of economic growth 
or stability and may themselves be unpopular if citizens feel their tax burdens are too 
high and/or services are under provided.  However, it is likely that short run adjustments 
using contingency funds are less costly politically than raising taxes.  Given these 
considerations, research has found that the optimal level of state contingency funds 
depends uniquely on the state in question and their respective revenue and expenditure 
variability, suggesting that it is necessary for each state to determine their optimal 
contingency level independently.  More specifically, states that have higher budget 
                                                          
52 All but four states, Alabama, Arkansas, Montana, and Oregon have state contingency 
funds.  
53 The literature considers the optimal size of contingency funds as a percentage of the 
state's general fund.  
54 Vermont does not require a balanced budget. 
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variability should have larger contingency funds and vice versa.  Using this standard, one 
would expect that contingency funds in education depend on the context of the district.  
 A priori, it is not clear that the optimal response of school districts to budget 
uncertainty should be the same as states' response.  Although tax collections can vary 
somewhat, revenue streams are generally predictable as they are funded by property taxes 
and state allocations based upon ensuring a given revenue per pupil.  However, the 
degree of predictability in local revenue varies as districts engage in property 
reassessment differently and property tax delinquencies can be worse in poor economic 
times.  As part of a federalist system of government, school districts have the state as a 
built in insurance provider that is able to provide production smoothing given an 
unforeseen catastrophic event.55  However, this does not control for unexpected revenue 
shortfalls which may be generated by state funding formula changes or state revenue 
shortfalls.  Regardless, the question remains if school districts do indeed respond to 
budget uncertainty by establishing and maintaining a contingency fund, and if so, how 
that contingency fund is used.   
 In determining how the district will handle budget uncertainty administrators face 
several choices.  For the purpose of this paper, Kentucky school districts, by mandate, 
must carry a contingency fund of at least 2% of operating expenses.  Regardless of the 
mandate, administrators must then choose how to fund the contingency and the amount of 
the fund.  Taxes play a large role in both of these decisions.  School districts must first 
decide if they are going to fund their contingencies through sacrificed production or 
                                                          
55 In Kentucky, the Kentucky School Boards Insurance Trust (KSBIT) is a non-profit 
organization that provides Kentucky school districts with insurance and risk management 
services. 
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increased taxes.  It is not obvious which choice is preferred as both have disadvantages.  
If districts do not expend their entire budget in a given time period, they may face 
objections from parents, students and/or teachers.  If a contingency fund is funded 
through increased taxes there may be resistance from taxpayers or a demand for more 
outputs to justify the increased burden.   
 Once administrators resolve how they will fund the contingency, they must 
choose the desired level of the contingency fund.  Ideally, according to the literature on 
state contingency funds, the fund amount should be a function of the budget variability 
and the potential budget shortfall.  However, large contingency funds, even if they are 
determined to be necessary by that rubric, may be looked upon unfavorably by taxpayers 
as excessive and unnecessary taxation since these funds are essentially idle taxpayer's 
dollars.  Conversely, taxpayers may be concerned with large increases in future tax 
burdens or cuts in production to cover unexpected budgetary shortfalls should the 
contingency fund be inadequate.  Tax increases are also costly to implement.  Indeed, in 
Kentucky local revenue increases exceeding 4% must meet voter approval.  Taxpayers’ 
ability to pay and budget deficits are often related to the same economic factors.  Much 
like states, local school district decision makers must contend with the delicate balance 
between current production and tax burdens while planning for possible budget shortfalls 
in the future.       
 In the case of school districts, it is not readily apparent that maintaining a 
contingency fund is an ideal strategy for managing budget uncertainty.  Do school 
districts experience enough budget uncertainty to warrant contingency funds, particularly 
since state and federal funds are typically formula driven?  Should districts hedge against 
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uncertainty when they are part of a federalist system of government?  If districts should 
carry a contingency fund, should it come from sacrificed consumption or increased taxes?  
Finally, how large should the fund be?  In moving forward, the size and use of school 
district contingency funds will focus on two main areas: the influence of budget 
variability and political economy factors.56   
 I suggest that, consistent with the previous literature on state contingency funds, 
budget variability would be expected to influence the size and use of school district 
contingency funds, where contingency funds are measured as a percent of the operating 
budget.  For the purpose of this paper, I consider budget variability to be a function of 
both revenue fluctuations as well as the fluctuations in demand for expenditures.   I also 
explicitly assume that since state and federal funds are mostly formula driven, revenue 
variability is primarily a function of the local revenue share of the budget.57  More 
specifically, districts with higher local budget shares are expected to have more budget 
variability, and during periods of budget shortfalls school districts will use their 
contingency funds to smooth production.  I also consider the political constraints that 
may be important in determining the size and use of contingency funds.  However, unlike 
budget variability, I offer no preconceptions as to the expected relationship between 
political factors and contingency fund size and use.  On one hand, Niskanen (1971) 
suggests that because of the information advantages on the part of the bureau, in this case 
the superintendant or principal; the budget may be higher than the minimal level of 
                                                          
56 Contingency fund use in this context refers to both expenditures from and additions to 
the contingency fund. 
57 There is also revenue from other sources, but this data is not included in the analysis as 
the percentages never exceed 2.4% and for most districts in most years the amount is 
zero. 
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resources necessary to produce their outcomes.  Accordingly, there is an opportunity for 
school districts to satisfy the wants of their sponsors (i.e. residents/taxpayers) without 
committing the entirety of their given budget.  Administrators can satisfy the wants of 
their sponsors while simultaneously placing funds into the contingency reserve for uses 
other than managing budget uncertainty.  On the other hand, transparency may be 
significant enough in school district outcomes and budgets to inhibit large contingencies.  
In this case, the administration may be more sensitive to their political constraints and 
less likely to carry large contingency fund balances.     
School District Contingency Funds in Kentucky 
School district contingency funds are not unique to Kentucky.  Indeed, Figure 4.1 
demonstrates that 16 out of 19 surrounding states allow or require school districts to 
maintain a contingency fund.  Although the particulars of each state vary somewhat in 
statutory limits and with how the funds may be used, the fact that they are a part of the 
budgeting process suggests that contingencies in these states may also be determined by 
budget variability as well as political economy factors.  Therefore, the findings of this 
research should be generalizable enough to inform contingency fund analysis in these 
states.     
 Kentucky, does however, present an interesting case in which to analyze school 
district contingency funds.  In 1990, concerned with equity of school financing, the 
Kentucky legislature enacted the Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA).  This  
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       Figure 4.1:  School District Contingency Fund Rules by State 
 
legislation was in large part motivated by the disparity in per pupil spending between 
Appalachian and non-Appalachian districts.58  As a result of a new state funding formula, 
per pupil revenues across districts moved toward financial equity (Bosworth, 2001; 
Weston & Sexton, 2009; Streams et al., 2011).59  By enacting this legislation, Kentucky 
effectively reduced the disparity in per pupil spending by over 50%.60  This suggests that  
                                                          
58 From 2001 through 2006 there were 74 Appalachian school districts and 102 non-
Appalachian school districts.  In 2007, Harrodsburg Independent merged with Mercer 
County School District and in 2008 Providence Independent merged with Webster 
County School District, reducing the number of non-Appalachian school districts to 101 
and 100 respectively. 
59 Although SEEK funding equalized Tier I state funding, districts are also able to levy 
additional taxes under Tier II funding which is subject to local voter referendum and not 
matched by the state.  
60 See Streams et al (2011). 
Required with a limit
Required with no limit
Allowed with a limit
Allowed with no limit
Not allowed
g     g y   y 
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Figure 4.2:  Academic Index by Region 
 
while there may still be an "Appalachia effect" in determining contingency funds, the 
increased access to resources addresses the concern that some districts may not have the 
financial ability to maintain contingency funds.  The Support Education Excellence in 
Kentucky (SEEK) formula as established through KERA arguably reduces budget 
variability across districts as it mandates a minimal level of local tax effort and also 
guarantees a base per pupil funding amount.  KERA, however, does not mandate how 
districts choose to spend their revenue.      
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In 1999, Kentucky also established a new outcome measure to accompany the 
equalization in revenues.  The outcome measure is a school academic index which is a 
weighted average of student performance at each performance level across several 
subjects and then averaged by district.61  Figure 2 shows the yearly academic index 
comparison between Appalachian and non-Appalachian districts.  As shown, considering 
legislative reform aimed at equalizing per pupil revenues and subsequent academic 
outcomes, there remains a distinct difference between the two regions although there has 
been recent convergence.62  This academic index does, however, provide a metric on 
which district administrators can be held accountable for educational production within 
the district and may possibly influence the size and use of contingency funds.         
Although districts in Kentucky have experienced revenue equalization, they have 
significant autonomy in how they decide to levy additional taxes and allocate their 
budgets.  This generates substantial variation between districts with how they choose to 
produce educational outcomes.  Most notably for the purpose of this research is the 
decision to reserve money into a contingency fund.  While Kentucky has a mandated 
district contingency fund of 2% of yearly operating expenses, the state recommends a 
10% contingency fund for school districts.  The state also does not limit the maximum 
size of the fund nor does it regulate how the fund is used.  Table 4.1 provides descriptive 
statistics of contingency funds in Kentucky as well as Appalachian and non-Appalachian 
districts.  On average, contingency funds are well above the state mandated 2% 
                                                          
61 Performance levels include: novice, apprentice, and proficient/distinguished.  Subject 
categories include: Reading, Mathematics, Science, and Writing. 
62 In 2007, Kentucky changed the scaling of the state tests.  Therefore, convergence of the 
academic indexes may be an artifact of the scale change.  See Barrett et al. (2011) for a 
discussion of the testing system in Kentucky. 
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regardless of group designation. Since contingency funds are mostly self-regulated in 
Kentucky, this presents an ideal scenario in which to determine the factors that influence 
their size and use.  Unfortunately, because of the way in which Kentucky defines school 
district contingency funds, the ability to inform this relationship, as traditionally 
considered, may be limited.    
In Kentucky, contingency funds are considered to be the difference between 
current assets and currents liabilities not appropriated to a specific expenditure in the 
following year or reserved for a specific purpose.  In accounting terms, this is equivalent 
to the unrestricted portion of net assets or retained earnings.  This is not the standard 
designation for contingency funds.  Accounting standards are to assign contingencies as 
designated or restricted funds within the larger category of retained earnings.  There is 
also usually some sort of procedure that must be satisfied to release them for use.  
Because the institutional definition of contingency funds in Kentucky is different than 
what is considered in the literature, I will now refer to these funds as the unrestricted fund 
balance. Since contingency funds are broadly defined by the state, it may be that only a 
portion of this fund is meant for managing budget uncertainty.  This increases 
considerably the factors which may influence the context of choice for the administrator.  
While administrators may still view the unrestricted fund balance as a means to manage 
budget uncertainty, the institutional anomaly about fund qualifications may dramatically 
affect the way in which administrators view the unrestricted fund balance for uses other 
than to manage budget variability.       
 
 
 77 
 
Table 4.1: Contingency Funds in Kentucky 
  
a. Statewide 
  
Operating 
Budget* 
Contingency 
Funds* 
Percent of 
Operating 
Budget 
Fund 
Use* 
Percent of 
Operating 
Budget 
Fund 
Additions* 
Percent of 
Operating 
Budget 
Y
ea
r 
2001 44579 4696 10.53         
2002 45828 4127 9.01 806 1.76 237 0.52 
2003 48858 4705 9.63 182 0.37 760 1.56 
2004 55291 4972 8.99 281 0.51 549 0.99 
2005 58935 5006 8.49 351 0.59 384 0.65 
2006 63939 5408 8.46 356 0.56 769 1.20 
2007 67689 6028 8.91 214 0.32 836 1.24 
2008 71691 6776 9.45 356 0.50 1105 1.54 
 
* 2001 Dollars.  Figures are in 100,000's and are totals 
             
  
b. Appalachia 
  
Operating 
Budget* 
Contingency 
Funds* 
Percent of 
Operating 
Budget 
Fund 
Use* 
Percent of 
Operating 
Budget 
Fund 
Additions* 
Percent of 
Operating 
Budget 
Y
ea
r 
2001 13869 1488 10.73         
2002 14060 1352 9.61 191 1.36 54 0.38 
2003 15072 1493 9.91 64 0.43 206 1.36 
2004 16828 1474 8.76 162 0.96 143 0.85 
2005 17539 1376 7.84 171 0.98 73 0.42 
2006 18557 1316 7.09 204 1.10 144 0.78 
2007 19391 1442 7.44 109 0.56 235 1.21 
2008 20276 1458 7.19 149 0.73 164 0.81 
 
* 2001 Dollars.  Figures are in 100,000's and are totals 
             
  
c. non-Appalachia 
  
Operating 
Budget* 
Contingency 
Funds* 
Percent of 
Operating 
Budget 
Fund 
Use* 
Percent of 
Operating 
Budget 
Fund 
Additions* 
Percent of 
Operating 
Budget 
Y
ea
r 
2001 30709 3207 10.44         
2002 31767 2775 8.74 615 1.94 183 0.58 
2003 33786 3212 9.51 118 0.35 555 1.64 
2004 38463 3498 9.09 119 0.31 406 1.05 
2005 41396 3630 8.77 179 0.43 311 0.75 
2006 45383 4093 9.02 153 0.34 625 1.38 
2007 48298 4586 9.50 105 0.22 601 1.24 
2008 51415 5318 10.34 208 0.40 940 1.83 
 
* 2001 Dollars.  Figures are in 100,000's and are totals 
     
As discussed previously, contingency funds are expected to be a function of 
district budget variability and the context of the district.  I also explicitly assume that 
various political economy factors may influence the unrestricted fund balance.  
Therefore, the explanatory variables of interest will be grouped into these two categories.  
This paper argues that the unrestricted fund balance is viewed by superintendents as a 
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means to create budget fungibility as opposed to simply smoothing productive capacity 
by managing budget uncertainty.  In particular, the lack of restrictions on fund use 
implies that superintendants can use the unrestricted fund balance as a slush fund. 
Data            
 The financial data used for this study came directly from the 2001 through 2008 
annual financial reports (AFR’s) from 176 school districts as reported to the Kentucky 
Office of Education Accountability (OEA).63  Within the AFR’s are the types of fund, the 
unit that the fund belongs to, the function and program on which the fund was allocated, 
and whether the fund was an expenditure, revenue, or balance sheet object.  Of particular 
relevance to this study, these data allow me to determine categories and levels of 
educational input spending, contingency fund levels, as defined by the state, as well as 
contingency use or contribution.  In addition to the AFR's, local levied tax rates were also 
obtained from OEA.  
Academic index scores are also available at the school level for the academic 
years 2001 through 2008.  These data were obtained from the Kentucky Department of 
Education (KDE).  District level demographics and characteristics were obtained for 
2001-2008 from the Common Core Data (CCD) and include: total enrollment, number of 
teachers, percentage of teachers with a master’s degree or higher and average years of 
teacher experience.  The data from these various sources were merged by district and 
year.  Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics for the data used in the following analysis. 
 
                                                          
63 A brief description of budget categories and coding can be found in Appendix B. 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics1 
 State Appalachia Non-Appalachia 
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Contingency Fund as % of Operating 11.115 14.569   9.032   5.146 12.638 18.514 
Variability Measures       
Local Revenue % Change   5.246 13.683   4.319 16.513   5.922 11.139 
State Revenue % Change   3.240   8.853   2.366   7.386   3.878   9.741 
Federal Revenue % Change   7.475 16.194    6.235 15.585   8.380 16.576 
Enrollment % Change  0.574   3.656   0.243   2.998   0.815   4.054 
% Teachers with Master's or higher 56.743 34.049 58.605 34.965 55.370 33.319 
Average Years of Experience   9.921   4.365 10.202   4.407   9.715   4.326 
Political Economy Measures       
Academic Index 77.653   9.142 76.522   8.931 78.477   9.211 
Levied Equivalent Rate 60.301 12.327 56.605   8.405 62.995 13.933 
Tax Increase   0.501   0.500   0.470   0.500   0.525   0.500 
% of Budget from Local Revenue 26.333 11.548 19.274   7.233 31.479 11.388 
% of Budget from State Revenue 57.750   9.472 62.777   6.209 54.086   9.758 
% of Budget from Federal Revenue 13.834   4.768 16.382   4.277 11.977   4.221 
Building Activity (dummy)2   0.394   0.489   0.373   0.484   0.409   0.492 
Future Building Activity (dummy)3   0.322   0.467   0.301   0.459   0.337   0.473 
1- All dollar amounts were adjusted to 2001 dollars. 
2- Coded as 1 if a school district engaged in major renovations, new construction or site acquisition in the current fiscal 
year. 
3- Coded as 1 if a school district engaged in major renovations, new construction or site acquisition in the next fiscal 
year. 
 
Variability Measures 
 The variability measures used in this analysis are intended to account for the 
contingency portion of the unrestricted fund balance.  Arguably, if there is a consistent 
relationship between these factors and the unrestricted fund balance, it could be 
suggested that administrators view the unrestricted fund balances as a means to manage 
budget uncertainty.  The variability measures account for both the fluctuations in 
productive capacity, the cost of providing educational services, as well as fluctuations in 
those factors that create demand for education production.  The use of these measures is 
intended to account for the variability that the administration faces in the budgeting 
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process and the impact that variability has on a given district's contingency fund portion 
of the unrestricted fund balance.  The standard deviation of the operating budget within 
districts is used.  It is expected that the higher the standard deviation the higher the 
contingency fund portion of the unrestricted fund balance.  This measure allows me to 
control for the variability that a district experiences over time.  The percentage change in 
the operating budget is decomposed into three parts; the percentage change in local 
revenue, the percentage change in state revenue, and the percentage change in federal 
revenue.  These measures are expected to be positively related to the size of the 
contingency fund portion.  In years of percentage increases, I expect that districts will 
allocate funds into the contingency to allow for production smoothing during years of 
percentage decreases.  Consequently, in years of percentage decreases, one would expect 
the contingency fund share of the unrestricted balance to decrease.  Conceptually, it is not 
apparent that the response by administrators will be the same for percentage changes in 
each revenue category.  Since state and federal funding changes are primarily formula 
driven the administrator may not respond to percentage changes from these sources of 
revenue as they may with local revenue percentage changes.  In other words, the 
variability in local revenue may be higher than the variability of federal and state 
revenue.  The expected effect of the percentage change in enrollments on contingency 
funds is negative; however it is  not clear that this relationship  will be statistically 
significant because projected enrollments is a part of the state's calculation for the 
operating budget.  However, if enrollment changes are unexpected then one would expect 
districts to use contingency funds during enrollment increases and reserve more into 
contingency funds during enrollment decreases.  Because the number of teachers is 
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closely tied to enrollments, the percentage change in teachers is not used.  However, 
since teacher salaries are determined by experience and degree, the average years of 
experience in the district as well as the percentage of teachers with a master's degree are 
included to account for the effect enrollment changes may have on salary expenditures.  
It is expected that districts with higher experience averages and percentage of teachers 
with a master's degree will have larger contingency funds.    
Political Economy Measures 
 Although the variability of the budget and of the demand for outputs is important 
in determining contingency levels, it may be that the contingency portion of the 
unrestricted fund balance is minimal.  The political constraints that administrators face 
may also be important in explaining the context in which the unrestricted fund balance 
size and use are determined.  A priori it is not clear how these constraints may influence 
the size and use of these school district fund balances.  On one hand, scrutiny from 
various sponsors may prevent administrators from maintaining their desired unrestricted 
fund balance level and may also constrain fund use.  Conversely, because of the 
budgeting process it may be easier for the administration than it is for sponsors to 
determine the minimal level of resources needed to produce a given output.  To account 
for the influence of political constraints on the unrestricted fund balance size and use 
several variables were used.  The district's academic index was included to control for 
academic accountability and the relationship between a district's fund balance and their 
educational production.  While the academic index is subject to the quality and mix of 
educational inputs, I explicitly assume that the administration will expend more resources 
in educational inputs to improve their respective academic index.  Therefore, I expect a 
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district's academic index to be negatively related to the size and use of a district's 
unrestricted fund balance.   
 A district's levied equivalent rate indicates a district's local tax effort.64  The 
expected relationship between the levied equivalent rate and unrestricted fund balance 
size and use is somewhat ambiguous.  On one hand, a high level may suggest that there is 
strong local support for schools and citizens may desire a larger fund balance.  Because 
of their high rates, these citizens may also be concerned about future tax increases to 
cover revenue shortfalls as they are more sensitive to marginal tax increases.  In this case 
the relationship between the levied local tax rate and the fund balance would be positive.  
On the other hand, local citizens may look at their tax burden and expect it to closely 
match the school district's current output to justify said burden.  In this case, the 
relationship between the local levied tax rate and a district's unrestricted fund balance 
would be statistically insignificant because districts would expend their budgets solely on 
current production.  Closely related to the local levied tax are local tax increases.  The 
expected relationship between district fund balances and local tax increases is negative 
for two reasons.  First, a tax increase may signify an expected revenue shortfall and 
therefore funds will be used from the unrestricted balance.  Second, local citizens will be 
resistant to increased fund balances in the presence of a higher tax burden. 
 The mix of revenue, as defined by the percent of the operating budget from local, 
state and federal sources, is also important in explaining the political context influencing 
the size and use of unrestricted fund balances.  The level of federal spending is expected 
                                                          
64 The levied equivalent rate is calculated by summing property, personal and motor 
vehicle tax revenue as well as any prior year permissive revenue.  That total is then 
multiplied by last year's collection rate.  That figure is then divided by the prior year's 
total assessment.   
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to be unrelated to the size and use of the fund balance as much of this funding is 
dedicated for specific uses.  The relationship between local and state mixes and fund 
balances is less clear.  The influence of the local percentage of revenues is ambiguous as 
it operates much like the local levied equivalent rate.  The influence of the state 
percentage of revenues is also ambiguous.  On one hand, since the state mandates that 
school districts maintain a contingency fund, as they define it, of 2% and recommends at 
least a 10% contingency, they may be more accepting of larger contingencies.  Therefore, 
the relationship between state revenue percentage and unreserved fund balance size and 
use would be positive.  Conversely, as the state commits a higher portion of a district's 
budget they may be less likely to accept larger contingencies as they may expect districts 
to increase local effort.  In this context, the relationship between the state portion of 
revenues and the unrestricted fund balance size and use would be negative. 
 It is useful to consider those factors which may constrain choice in the 
determination of unrestricted fund balances.  It is also important to consider choices for 
the alternative use of these fund balances.  Conceptually, the unrestricted fund balance is 
accumulated savings over time.  I have previously discussed the funds use as a tool to 
smooth production under budget uncertainty, but savings can also be for objectives that 
are unattainable through expenditure from the current budget.  Of these factors, capital 
projects are likely the most common across school districts.  While there are categories in 
the budget specific to capital projects, the administrator’s desire for fungibility may 
motivate their choice to fund certain capital through the unrestricted fund balance. 
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 Two variables are used to evaluate the relationship between unrestricted fund 
balances and building projects.  The first is a current year building dummy.65  This 
variable is coded as one if a district engaged in major renovations, new construction or 
site acquisition in the current fiscal year.  Because of the unrestricted size and use of 
these funds, it is expected that this variable will have a negative relationship with changes 
in the fund levels.  The second is a next year building dummy.  This variable is coded as 
one if a district engaged in major renovations, new construction or site acquisition in the 
next fiscal year.  Because it often takes many years to accumulate the funds necessary to 
engage in building projects it is not clear that this variable will be related to current 
unrestricted fund changes.66  However, future building projects would be expected to 
have a positive impact on current changes in unrestricted fund balances as districts 
allocate more funds into the balance in expectation of their future use for building 
projects.          
Model and Results 
 For estimation, I am concerned with the factors that influence both the size of 
unrestricted fund balances as well as the change in fund levels.  Consistent with previous 
literature and theory, I assume the contingency fund portion of the unrestricted balance to 
be a function of budget variability.  Because of the institutional definition of contingency 
funds in Kentucky, I also consider that the unrestricted fund balances may be a function 
of political economy factors. In addition, I suggest that there are various district level 
                                                          
65 Percentage changes in spending for building projects could not be used as there are 
many years in which this spending is zero. 
66 Unfortunately, because of data availability, the time horizon of future building projects 
could not be extended. 
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factors important in determining the size and change of unrestricted balances that are 
unobserved in the data set.  Accordingly, both a district between effects model and a 
district fixed effects model were estimated to account for the level and change of 
unrestricted fund balances respectively as well as the influence of unobserved factors.                                                          
 The between effects model estimating the average unrestricted balances was 
modeled as follows: 
𝑌�𝑖 =   𝛽0 + 𝜶𝑽�𝒊 +  𝜷𝑷�𝒊 + 𝜸𝑭𝒊 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀?̅?                                                                          (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖 is the average size of district i's fund balance as a percentage of district i's 
operating budget.  𝛽0 is the constant term.  The term 𝜶 is a vector of coefficients 
associated with the vector 𝑽𝒊 which are average measures of district i's variability.  𝑷𝒊 is a 
vector of average political economy factors for district i and 𝜷 is a vector of the 
associated coefficients.  𝑭𝒊 is a vector of measured time invariant characteristics of 
district i and 𝜸 is a vector of the associated coefficients.   𝜃𝑖 is district i's fixed effect as 
part of the disturbance and  𝜀?̅? is the idiosyncratic error.  
 The fixed effects model estimating the changes or use of the unrestricted fund 
balance within districts was modeled as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =   𝛽0 + 𝜶𝑽𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝑷𝒊𝒕 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                  (2) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the size of district i's contingency fund as a percentage of district i's operating 
budget in year t.  𝛽0 is the constant term.  The term 𝜶 is a vector of coefficients 
associated with the vector 𝑽𝒊𝒕 which are measures of district i's variability in year t.  𝑷𝒊𝒕 
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is a vector of political economy factors for district i in year t and 𝜷 is a vector of the 
associated coefficients.  𝜃𝑖 is district i's fixed effect and  𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error. 
Average Unrestricted Fund Balance Results  
 Table 4.3 presents the results of the between effects estimation of the average 
levels of school district unrestricted fund balances.  As a control, the average prior year 
unrestricted fund balance was used.  The lagged fund balance is statistically significant 
and positive at the 1% level, suggesting that all else equal a 1% increase in the average 
fund balance lag results in a .919% increase in the current year’s contingency fund.  This 
result is not surprising as one would expect the average of last year’s contingency fund to 
be highly predictive of the average current year contingency fund.67  The average 
percentage change in the state percentage of the operating budget is statistically 
significant at the 10% level in predicting average unrestricted fund balance size, 
indicating that a 1% increase in the average state percent of the operating budget results 
in a .071% increase in the average contingency fund.  This is particularly relevant if one 
considers the state recommendation of a 10% contingency fund.  The only other 
variability measures statistically significant in explaining the average fund balance levels 
are the average teacher qualification measures.  These measures control for teacher 
salaries mandated by district salary schedules which are closely tied to experience and 
degree level.  Teacher salaries represent the largest expenditure item for a district and the 
significance of these variables is expected given a potential budget shortfall.  However,  
 
                                                          
67 The lagged value is statistically different from zero at the 99.9% level, suggesting that 
it does not account for all of the variation in current unrestricted fund balances.  
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Table 4.3: Predicted Unrestricted Fund Balance 
Independent Variables Between Effects Model Fixed Effects Model Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Variability Measures     
Unrestricted Fund Balance Lag   0.919*** 0.006  0.364*** 0.023 
Operating Budget Std, Dev.   3.410       16.210        --           -- 
Local Revenue % Change   0.014 0.024    -0.005 0.014 
State Revenue % Change   0.071* 0.040    -0.032 0.023 
Federal Revenue % Change   0.004 0.017     0.009 0.012 
Enrollment % Change  -0.027 0.060    -0.006 0.046 
Average Years of Experience   0.237*** 0.079  0.006 0.131 
% Teachers With Masters or higher  -0.044** 0.019  0.004 0.020 
Political Economy Measures     
Academic Index  -0.010 0.014    -0.068** 0.034 
Levied Equivalent Rate  -0.005 0.007  0.164*** 0.055 
Tax Increase  -0.445 0.427    -0.948*** 0.328 
% of Budget from Local Revenue1   0.014 0.023  0.327** 0.145 
% of Budget from State Revenue   0.003 0.026     0.195 0.122 
Appalachian District  -0.469*** 0.184      -- -- 
Fayette/Jefferson  -0.102 0.794      -- -- 
Current Building Activity  -0.217 1.148    -1.043*** 0.407 
Future Building Activity  -0.329 1.328  0.002 0.421 
N(Groups) 1220(176) 1220(176) 
F Statistic 1743.29 97.60 
* significant at the 10% level  ** significant at the 5% level  *** significant at the 1% level 
1 - Percent of the budget from federal revenue is the reference group. 
 
the different sign on experience and the percentage of teachers with a Masters degree is 
difficult to explain.  The only political economy measure statistically significant in 
explaining average fund balance levels is the Appalachia indicator.  The Appalachia 
indicator is statistically significant at the 1% level and suggests that districts in 
Appalachia, on average, have fund balances .469% less than their non-Appalachian 
counterparts.  
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Unrestricted Fund Use Results 
 Table 4.3 presents the results of the fixed effects estimation of unrestricted fund 
use. 68   As in the between effects estimation, the lag of a district's unrestricted fund 
balance was used as a control.  The lag is statistically significant at the 1% level and 
indicates that, all else equal, an increase of 1% from a district's average fund balance 
level results in a .364% increase in the current fund balance.  There are no other 
variability measures significant in explaining the changes in unrestricted fund balances.    
 There are several political economy measures which are significant in explaining 
unrestricted fund use.  A district's average academic index is statistically significant at the 
5% level and suggests that a one point increase in the academic index from the mean 
results in a .068% decrease in a district's current unrestricted fund balance.  A district's 
levied equivalent rate is statistically significant at the 1% level.  Districts which increase 
their levied equivalent rate one percent above their mean increase their current year's 
fund balance by .164%.  Districts which enact a tax increase in the current year decrease 
their unrestricted fund balance by .948%.  This is statistically significant at the 1% level 
and is in the expected direction.  Finally, districts that increase their local revenue mix by 
1% from the mean increase their current year fund balance by .327%.  This result is 
significant at the 5% level. 
 It was previously suggested that administrators may view the unrestricted fund 
balance as a way to create budget fungibility. One possible use of the fund is for capital 
                                                          
68 Previous research has also shown that general economic conditions, captured by year 
dummies, are also important in explaining contingency funds.  The model was also 
specified using year dummies.  None of the years were significant in explaining changes 
in unrestricted fund balances.  
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projects.  The results of the estimation suggest that if a district engages in new building 
activity in the current year, it is related to a 1.043% decrease in the unrestricted fund 
balance, and is significant at the 1% level.  In other words, current year new building 
activity is negatively related to the difference between a district's current year fund 
balance and the district's mean fund balance.  Considering the intended use of the 
contingency fund − as a means for managing budget variability − this relationship is 
noteworthy as building projects are not considered to be a component of budget 
uncertainty.   
 To better understand the context of these choices by school district administrators, 
I reviewed state policies regarding contingency funds and capital projects.   Prior to 2001, 
Kentucky had a statutorily mandated cap on contingency funds of 10% of operating 
expenses.  Any funds accumulated in the unrestricted fund balance which exceeded the 
10% mandate were restricted to the School Facilities Construction Commission and were 
no longer considered to be part of the unrestricted balance.  This meant that districts were 
restricted in the priority of the building projects they could undertake.  Priority 1-3 needs 
include renovating or constructing new school buildings.  Priority 4 needs include athletic 
facilities, new construction or renovation for the central office and bus garages.  More 
specifically, if a district had priority 1, 2 or 3 needs, they would have to be met before 
priority 4 projects could be funded.  The 10% contingency mandate cap was eliminated in 
2001 effectively making the funds unrestricted in their use no matter the size of the 
balance.  This suggests that administrators can now circumvent priority 1, 2 and 3 
building needs by allocating funds into the unrestricted fund and engage in building 
projects as they see fit.  Because of the unrestricted size of these funds and the absence of 
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restrictions on its use, there is cause to suspect that administrators may use contingency 
funds as a means to create budget fungibility by circumventing other budgeting 
constraints. 
 It is not clear that this is or is not an ideal approach to addressing building needs.  
On one hand, districts may not have the bonding capacity to debt finance and the use of 
the unrestricted fund balance allows these districts to save for future building needs.  On 
the other hand, the used of the fund balance to save for future building projects allows the 
administration to bypass state priority building needs.  This issue is further complicated if 
one considers the alignment of the cost of building projects and the accrued benefits of 
those projects.  One could argue that if building needs are debt financed the benefits of 
those projects will be accrued by those currently bearing the costs within the district, 
either by increased tax burdens or sacrificed consumption of educational inputs.  If the 
building projects are self financed, this alignment is not apparent.  This is particularly 
relevant as the time period of savings increases.   
Conclusions and Implications 
 School finance literature has long been focused on equity and the effects of 
increased educational inputs.  However, research has failed to address how schools 
manage budget uncertainty.  Through data collected from Kentucky school districts, this 
paper has provided an analysis of the factors that influence the size and use of 
unrestricted fund balances funds through between and fixed effects models respectively.  
Consistent with previous research evaluating contingency funds at the state level and 
theory, both variability and political economy measures were used.  Results overall 
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indicate that budget variability, through both revenue and expenditure categories, has 
little influence on changes in unrestricted fund balances within districts but does explain 
some of the variation across districts.  Conversely, the political economy measures 
explain little of the variation in fund levels, but do influence the within district variation 
of unrestricted fund balances. 
 It was not the intention of this research to provide insight into the optimal level of 
contingency funds for districts as a means to manage budget uncertainty.  However, 
because of the institutional definition of contingency funds in Kentucky, the results 
suggest that administrators may view contingency funds as a method to bypass other 
institutional constraints.  Furthermore, the broad definition of contingency funds by the 
state suggests that the portion of the fund intended to manage budget uncertainty may be 
minimal, which allows for a significant amount of budget fungibility for the administrator 
and significantly decreases the transparency of the budgeting process.  As of 2008, there 
was almost 700 million dollars in district contingency funds in Kentucky.  It is not clear 
that budget uncertainty is significant enough within districts to warrant these 
contingencies as this is a significant amount of idle resources.  While there is some 
variability in district operating budgets, they are relatively predictable as revenue from 
state and federal sources is primarily formula driven.  Furthermore, the variability in local 
revenue is unrelated to contingency fund levels and use.   
 Although beyond the scope of this research, the institutional ambiguity of district 
contingency funds in Kentucky suggests that there may be better alternatives to managing 
budget uncertainty in education.  It may be that budget uncertainty could be better 
handled at the state level by risk pooling.  In this context, there could be a state run 
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educational contingency fund.  Districts could then apply for funds based upon whatever 
rules the state determines.  Future research should focus on the efficiency implications of 
having state run educational contingencies versus district level contingency funds for 
managing budget uncertainty.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Nathan Barrett 2011 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RESEARCH PROSPECTS 
Dissertation Summary      
 Public K-12 education is a significant endeavor in the U.S.  This institutional 
environment creates a variety of incentives which influence choices of public school 
teachers and administrators in the provision of educational outputs.  Often, institutional 
policies and procedures create conflicting incentives so that their actual effect on the 
choices made by teachers and administrators is not apparent.   This dissertation is 
comprised of three essays which address various institutional policies and practices, the 
incentives they create, and the resulting choices of teachers and administrators. 
 Chapter 2 analyzed the relationship between teaching effectiveness and the 
decision to participate in content-based professional development.  Institutional policy in 
Kentucky requires that teachers engage in four days of professional development activity. 
There is no requirement as to the type of program or for programs to demonstrate 
effectiveness.  Ideally, professional development policy would be designed to create 
incentives for participation to those that would benefit most from effective programs.  In 
examining the design of the AMSP program, it is not evident that these incentives were in 
place.  However, upon analysis, it was shown that less effective teachers engaged in the 
professional development activities at a higher rate than their more effective counterparts.  
Controlling for the choice to participate based upon teaching effectiveness; it was then 
shown that the program was effective in promoting student achievement for 5th and 11th 
grades.   
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 Chapter 3 addressed the choice of class size by administrators in response to 
teaching effectiveness.  A priori, because of competing incentives created by various 
institutional constraints, the relationship was not clear.  On one hand, because of tenure 
and salary schedule constraints, administrators may view class size reductions as a 
method to reward teaching effectiveness.  On the other hand, because of increased school 
accountability, administrators may increase class sizes of more effective teachers to 
improve overall school performance.  Using an estimated measure of teaching 
effectiveness, it was shown that more effective teachers have larger classes.  This 
suggests that school accountability provides greater incentives for administrators in their 
choice of class sizes. 
 Chapter 4 presented an analysis of contingency funds in Kentucky public school 
districts.  Kentucky provides a unique context in which to analyze these funds as the 
institutional ambiguity of their definition provides districts significant autonomy with 
how they choose to fund and use their contingencies.  While this limits the extent that the 
analysis can provide insight into contingency funds as customarily defined, it does 
provide an interesting context to evaluate choice.  Using both between and fixed effects 
models to estimate levels and changes respectively, it was shown that school district 
contingency funds have little relation to variability measures.  Instead, it appears as 
though administrators view contingency funds as a means to create budget fungibility.  
More specifically, is the use of these funds for building projects.  While this chapter 
cannot speak as to the efficiency of this practice, it does raise an interesting question 
about the nature of contingency funds and the incentives it creates for administrators in 
the budgeting process and the resulting transparency of budgetary practices.            
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Policy Implications 
 The findings of this dissertation inform both general education policy as well as 
policy regarding the specific institutional settings evaluated.  In general, more effective 
education policy is attainable if policy makers recognize several key elements of choice 
in the non-market provision of educational outputs.  It is often difficult to foresee the 
incentives that various institutional policies and practices create.  Often, the incentives 
created for those implementing policy generate outcomes which are misaligned with the 
intended outcomes.  To assess this alignment, a framework of evaluation of institutional 
practices should be developed to first assess what it desired from a given initiative, and 
second, to evaluate the incentives for those implementing policies to determine any 
unintended consequences of the choices those incentives elicit.  In doing so, policy 
development can be better informed. 
 The goal of professional development is to provide an opportunity for in-service 
teachers to improve or maintain their effectiveness in the classroom.  However, the way 
in which these programs are implemented dramatically affects the ability of professional 
development to achieve this goal.  Merely requiring a certain number of days of 
professional development does not guarantee that participation will enhance teacher 
effectiveness and in turn student achievement.  Furthermore, if there are no institutional 
standards requiring programs to demonstrate effectiveness, teachers could be 
participating in ineffective programs.  Finally, there is no systematic allocation of 
professional development activities based on need or teaching effectiveness.  These 
institutional characteristics provide little guidance for the effective delivery of 
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professional development and potentially limit its ability to improve the quality of in-
service teachers.       
 The debate on class size focuses on its impact on student outcomes.  This 
dissertation evaluated class size in a different context; as a policy instrument to either 
reward teaching performance or affect overall school performance.  It was shown that 
class sizes of more effective teachers are larger relative to their less effective 
counterparts.  From a policy perspective, the short run implication is promising; 
administrators recognize differentials in performance and respond in a manner that 
promotes student achievement.  Although beyond the scope of the research, one potential 
long run policy implication is that more effective teachers may respond to this practice by 
choosing to sort into schools with higher compensation or higher average teacher quality, 
thereby reducing the average teacher quality of their former schools.          
 Many states have institutional policies concerning educational contingency funds, 
yet they have received little attention in the academic literature.  Contingency funds, as 
traditionally defined, are restricted funds and are used to manage budget uncertainty.  
This research cautions that contingency funds may not have the same institutional 
definition in education.  The findings suggest that how these funds are defined may have 
a considerable influence on how they are viewed and used by school administrators.  The 
implications for policy begin at addressing the need for institutions to establish a clear 
definition of the purpose of contingency funds.  Policy makers can then determine 
institutional rules and procedures that promote the intended function of the contingency 
fund.  An analysis of implementation can then inform if the incentives created by the 
institutional constraints elicit administrator choices which are aligned with intended 
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policy.  The evidence in Kentucky suggests that the ambiguity in the institutional 
definition of contingency funds may lead to a wide variance in administrator choice.  The 
ambiguity also suggests that I cannot say if administrator choices are aligned with the 
desired institutional function as this function is not specified.                
Limitations and Future Research 
 It was the intent of this dissertation to present an alternative view of choice in K-
12 education.  I suggest that the foundation of education policy should be the 
advancement of student outcomes.  The public contribution to those outcomes is only 
attainable through the millions of individuals that provide educational services, and more 
importantly the choices they make.  Because of the nature of the data used, the key 
limitation of this study is the generalizability of the results to the entire population or 
alternative subset of students, teachers, and schools.  Much of the data used in this 
dissertation accounted for a subset of students, teachers, and schools, which may be very 
different from their respective populations.  While the results are suggestive, the 
evaluation of choice in the institutional contexts addressed should continue by using 
different subsets of the population. 
 A second important limitation concerns the use of the value added modeling in 
the second and third chapters.  A major component of value added modeling is the use of 
student achievement measures, typically test scores, over time.  The data used allowed 
me to view student achievement over time in multiple subjects, but the testing system in 
Kentucky presented two main obstacles.  The first obstacle was the change in the testing 
scale for each subject over the observed time period.  To reconcile scores from the 
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different scales I transformed the scaled scores into ranks and z-scores.  However, the 
compression of the scale in 2007 and 2008 significantly reduced the variation in student 
achievement.  The second obstacle was the testing intervals of the CATS tests from 2000 
through 2006.  In an effort to reduce the intervals between testing years, CTBS 
achievement tests were used in math and reading as controls.  The CTBS test was not 
administered in science.  The use of the CTBS tests required the explicit assumption that 
the tests measured a student's ability in math and reading in a way that was systematically 
comparable to the CATS tests over time.  The data available in non-experimental settings 
is seldom without complications, but it is important to note these caveats.  Again, while 
the results are suggestive, the evaluation of choice in the institutional contexts addressed 
would benefit from value added modeling under different testing schemes.   
 The dissertation also provides future research questions specific to the 
institutional environments considered.  Conceptually, the use of professional 
development is an effort to improve the human capital of teachers and their ability to 
promote student achievement.  While the evaluation of particular programs is important, 
there is an opportunity to evaluate professional development in a two broader, perhaps 
more significant, contexts.  The first is an evaluation of the societal costs and benefits 
associated with professional development.  Given the large scale use of professional 
development across states, it is reasonable to question if we are affecting student 
outcomes commensurate with the costs of administering professional development.  The 
second is an assessment of professional development as an alternative to traditional 
teacher training programs.  By definition, teachers engaging in professional development 
have spent time in the classroom.  Accordingly, they may have a better understanding of 
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how to employ the methods learned than a student who does not have that frame of 
reference. 
 The use of class size as a policy tool to affect overall school performance presents 
two avenues for future research.  As discussed previously, the first could address the 
possible response of teachers in the long run.  The second opportunity for research would 
be to determine if this practice occurs in the private education market.  Administrators in 
private schools are not typically constrained by tenure and salary schedules.  However, 
administrators may still have resource or institutional constraints that restrain their ability 
to attach pecuniary awards to differentials in teaching effectiveness.  It would be useful to 
assess if private school administrators respond with adjustments in class size to affect 
overall school performance. 
 The institutional definition of contingency funds in Kentucky limited the ability 
of the analysis to inform how school districts respond to budget uncertainty.  An obvious 
extension of the analysis is to identify a state that defines educational contingency funds 
in a manner consistent with the traditional definition.  The resulting analysis could then 
inform how schools respond to budget uncertainty and how they determine their optimal 
level.      
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Appendix A: Chapter 3 Results with Z-Scores 
Table A.1:  Student Achievement with Teacher Fixed Effects (00-08, z-scores)  
Independent Variables Grade 5  Grade 8 Grade 11 
Math Z-score Lagged 0.316 *** 0.354 *** 0.428 *** 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.012) 
 Science Z-score Lagged 0.257 *** 0.286 *** 0.118 *** 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.013) 
 Reading Z-score Lagged  0.225 *** 0.208 *** 0.361 *** 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
    Student Characteristics 
      Free and Reduced Price (FRP) Lunch -0.251 *** -0.214 *** -0.125 *** 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.016) 
 Female -0.008 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.080 *** 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.012) 
 Asian 0.433 *** 0.496 *** 0.324 *** 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.058) 
 Black -0.24 *** -0.283 *** -0.368 *** 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.025) 
 Hispanic -0.156 *** -0.167 *** -0.336 *** 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.058) 
 Indian 0.173 
 
-0.413 *** -0.446 *** 
 
(0.245) 
 
(0.156) 
 
(0.168) 
 Other -0.066 
 
0.063 
 
-0.112 
 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.079) 
    School Characteristics 
      Class Size 0.003 ** 0.000
 
-0.001
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Average Experience -0.004 
 
-0.015 ** -0.018 ** 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.009) 
 Enrollment 0.000 
 
0.000 ** 0.000 *** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 Percent Master's 0.001 
 
0.002 *** 0.000 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Percent of FRP Students 0.029 
 
0.071 
 
-0.049 
 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.055) 
 Expenditure per Student 0.000 
 
0.000 ** 0.000 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 Student-Teacher Ratio -0.007 
 
-0.012 * 0.026 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 Student-Computer Ratio -0.004 
 
0.011 
 
0.004 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.005) 
 Math Index 0.001 * 0.002 ** 0.003 *** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
    Teacher Characteristics 
      Highest Degree Obtained -0.025
 
0.025
 
-0.004
 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.021) 
 Experience 4-7 Years -0.139 * -0.129 ** 0.071 
 
 
(0.083) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.052) 
 Experience 8-12 Years -0.155 * -0.180 *** -0.058 
 
 
(0.080) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.062) 
 Experience 13-17 Years -0.302 *** -0.224 *** -0.065 
 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.076) 
 Experience 18 Years and Higher -0.351 *** -0.289 *** -0.097 
 
 
(0.119) 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.083) 
 N 22859    27952    18009  
 F-Test (282.48) *** (411.54) *** (270.81) *** 
Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses are presented in the table. 
*indicates 0.10 level of significance ** indicates 0.05 level of significance, *** indicates 0.01 level of significance 
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Table A.2: Student Achievement Censored With AMSP Participation Propensity (z-
scores 
Independent Variables Grade 5 Grade 8 Grade 11 
Math Z-score Lagged 0.305 *** 0.348 *** 0.436 *** 
 (0.022)  
(0.015) 
 
(0.023) 
 Science Z-score Lagged 0.167 *** 0.209 *** 0.328 *** 
 (0.022)  
(0.016) 
 
(0.021) 
 Reading Z-score Lagged 0.274 *** 0.305 *** 0.150 *** 
 (0.024)  (0.017)  
(0.032) 
            Student Characteristics 
      Free and Reduced Price (FRP) Lunch -0.238 *** -0.113 *** -0.104 *** 
 (0.030)  
(0.020) 
 
(0.029) 
 Female -0.025 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.040 
  (0.027)  
(0.019) 
 
(0.028) 
 Non-white -0.148 ** -0.104 * -0.213 ** 
 (0.073)  
(0.054) 
 
(0.088) 
 Class size 0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  
(0.003) 
            School Characteristics 
      Average Experience 0.025
 
-0.113 *** 0.000
  (0.045)  
(0.040) 
 
(0.049) 
 Enrollment 0.000 
 
-0.002 
 
0.000 
  (0.000)  
(0.002) 
 
(0.000) 
 Percent Master’s 0.002 
 
0.000 
 
0.006 * 
 (0.006)  
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 Percent of FRP Students -0.790 *** -0.083 
 
-0.030 
  (0.195)  
(0.176) 
 
(0.129) 
 Expenditure per Student 0.000 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 
  (0.000)  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 Student-Teacher Ratio 0.037 
 
0.102 ** -0.029 
  (0.026)  
(0.047) 
 
(0.040) 
 Student-Computer Ratio -0.188 
 
0.000 
 
-0.021 
  (0.125)  
(0.033) 
 
(0.034) 
 Math Index 0.025 ** -0.004 
 
0.018 *** 
 (0.010)  (0.007)  
(0.005) 
            Teacher Characteristics       Participation in AMSP PD -0.050 
 
-0.039
 
0.186 ** 
 (0.202)  
(0.095) 
 
(0.090) 
 Highest Degree Obtained -0.133 
 
0.104 * 0.015 
  (0.092)  
(0.059) 
 
(0.089) 
 Experience 4-7 Years 0.088 
 
-0.179 ** 
  
 
(0.255) 
 
(0.083) 
   Experience 8-12 Years 
  
-0.296 ** 0.046
 
   
(0.148) 
 
(0.115) 
 Experience 13-17 Years -0.198
 
-0.269 
   
 
(0.654) 
 
(0.258) 
   Experience 18 Years and Higher 
             N   3004    4627    2153    
F-Test (74.56) ***  (193.09) ***  (79.35) ***  
Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses are presented in the table. 
*indicates 0.10 level of significance ** indicates 0.05 level of significance, *** indicates 0.01 level of significance 
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Table A.3: Student Achievement - Teacher Fixed Effects and Participation (Actual, z-
scores) 
Independent Variables Grade 5  Grade 8 Grade 11 
Math Z-score Lagged 0.316 *** 0.353 *** 0.429 *** 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.012) 
 Science Z-score Lagged 0.257 *** 0.286 *** 0.117 *** 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.013) 
 Reading Z-score Lagged  0.225 *** 0.208 *** 0.361 *** 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
    Student Characteristics 
      Free and Reduced Price (FRP) Lunch -0.252 *** -0.215 *** -0.125 *** 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.016) 
 Female -0.008 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.080 *** 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.012) 
 Asian 0.433 *** 0.496 *** 0.325 *** 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.058) 
 Black -0.240 *** -0.283 *** -0.367 *** 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.025) 
 Hispanic -0.156 *** -0.167 *** -0.337 *** 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.058) 
 Indian 0.176 
 
-0.415 *** -0.445 *** 
 
(0.246) 
 
(0.156) 
 
(0.168) 
 Other -0.066 
 
0.063 
 
-0.112 
 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.079) 
    School Characteristics 
      Class Size 0.003 ** 0.000
 
-0.001
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Average Experience -0.005 
 
-0.015 * -0.017 ** 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 Enrollment 0.000 
 
0.000 ** 0.000 *** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 Percent Master's 0.001 
 
0.003 *** 0.000 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Percent of FRP Students 0.035 
 
0.080 
 
-0.035 
 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.057) 
 Expenditure per Student 0.000 
 
0.000 ** 0.000 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 Student-Teacher Ratio -0.007 
 
-0.013 * 0.025 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 Student-Computer Ratio -0.004 
 
0.010 
 
0.004 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.005) 
 Math Index 0.001 * 0.002 *** 0.003 *** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
    Teacher Characteristics 
      Participation in AMSP PD 0.053 ** 0.031
 
0.062
 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.062) 
 Highest Degree Obtained -0.023 
 
0.025 
 
-0.004 
 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.021) 
 Experience 4-7 Years -0.141 * -0.134 ** 0.069 
 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.052) 
 Experience 8-12 Years -0.156 ** -0.183 *** -0.064 
 
 
(0.079) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.063) 
 Experience 13-17 Years -0.302 *** -0.234 *** -0.076 
 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.076) 
 
(0.077) 
 Experience 18 Years and Higher -0.347 *** -0.299 *** -0.105 
 
 
(0.120) 
 
(0.079) 
 
(0.085) 
 N 22859    27952 
 
  18009    
F-Test (281.90) ***  (405.60) ***  (260.38) ***  
Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses are presented in the table. 
*indicates 0.10 level of significance ** indicates 0.05 level of significance, *** indicates 0.01 level of significance 
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Appendix B: Chapter 4 Results with Z-Scores 
Table B.1: Predicted Student Z-scores with Teacher Fixed Effects (00-08)  
*indicates 0.10 level of significance, **indicates 0.05 level of significance, *** indicates 0.01 level of significance 
    
 
Coefficients  
(robust std. errors) 
Coefficients  
(robust std. errors) 
Coefficients  
(robust std. errors) 
Independent Variables Grade 5 Grade 8 Grade 11 
Teacher Characteristics    
Experience -0.035*** (0.014) 
-0.020 
(0.016) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
Experience Squared 0.0007* (0.0004) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
Highest Degree Obtained -0.021 (0.024) 
0.018 
(0.019) 
-0.009 
(0.020) 
Student Characteristics 
 
  
Math z-score lag 0.315*** (0.014) 
0.353*** 
(0.011) 
0.428*** 
(0.012) 
Science z-score lag 0.258*** (0.012) 
0.285*** 
(0.012) 
0.118*** 
(0.013) 
Reading z-score lag 0.226*** (0.012) 
0.209*** 
(0.010) 
0.361*** 
(0.010) 
Free and Reduced Price 
(FRP)Lunch  
-0.252*** 
(0.016) 
-0.215*** 
(0.019) 
-0.125*** 
(0.016) 
Female -0.007 (0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
-0.080*** 
(0.012) 
Asian 0.433*** (0.068) 
0.497*** 
(0.045) 
0.321*** 
(0.057) 
Black -0.239*** (0.023) 
-0.283*** 
(0.022) 
-0.369*** 
(0.026) 
Hispanic -0.153*** (0.039) 
-0.169*** 
(0.038) 
-0.337*** 
(0.058) 
Native American 0.167 (0.243) 
-0.404*** 
(0.152) 
-0.448*** 
(0.167) 
Other -0.061 (0.057) 
0.063 
(0.053) 
-0.114 
(0.079) 
School Characteristics 
 
  
Class Size 0.003 (0.002) 
-0.0005 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Average Experience -0.005 (0.008) 
-0.015** 
(0.007) 
-0.017** 
(0.008) 
Enrollment 0.0001* 0.00006 
0.0001** 
(0.00006) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.00005) 
Percent Master’s  0.0004 (0.0006) 
0.002*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.00006 
(0.0009) 
Percent of FRP students -0.019** (0.008) 
0.056 
(0.048) 
-0.042*** 
(0.009) 
Expenditure per student 0.00001* (0.00001) 
0.00003** 
(0.00001) 
0.00001 
(0.00001) 
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.007 (0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.007) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
Student-Computer Ratio -0.004 (0.006) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
Math Index 0.001** (0.0007) 
0.0017*** 
(0.0007) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
N 
Fraction of Variance 
22859   
0.392 
27952 
0.366 
18009  
0.387 
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Table B.2: Predicted Class Size (pooled-OLS, z-scores) 
*indicates 0.10 level of significance, **indicates 0.05 level of significance, *** indicates 0.01 level of significance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficients  
(robust std. errors) 
Coefficients  
(robust std. errors) 
Coefficients  
(robust std. errors) 
Independent Variables Grade 5 Grade 8 Grade 11 
Teacher Characteristics    
Past Effectiveness 0.527 (0.493) 
0.953*** 
(0.239) 
1.239*** 
(0.3429) 
Experience  -0.021 (0.026) 
0.0303 
(0.0402) 
-0.0399 
(0.0299) 
Highest Degree Obtained -0.318 (0.285) 
0.5023** 
(0.2369) 
0.4991** 
(0.2391) 
Classroom Characteristics 
 
  
Math rank lag -0.7921* (0.4544) 
0.7262 
(0.5861) 
1.0424* 
(0.5542) 
Science rank lag -0.1136 (0.1882) 
-1.0032** 
(0.4962) 
-0.2535 
(0.5673) 
Reading rank lag 0.3940 (0.4238) 
-0.5832 
(0.6436) 
-0.5642 
(0.3483) 
Free and Reduced Price 
(FRP)Lunch  
3.254** 
(1.429) 
-1.276 
(1.675) 
-3.766** 
(1.811) 
Asian -1.935 (4.510) 
16.805 
(14.020) 
-5.030 
(5.054) 
Black -0.976 (1.954) 
-7.972*** 
(3.889) 
-12.136*** 
(2.502) 
Hispanic -11.073*** (2.849) 
1.101 
(5.654) 
30.075*** 
(6.568) 
Native American 2.003 (25.041) 
420.315*** 
(160.462) 
187.195* 
(107.925) 
Other -3.845 (6.239) 
-4.242 
(9.477) 
4.860 
(12.203) 
School Characteristics 
 
  
Expenditure per student -0.0004*** (0.0001) 
-0.0010*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0004) 
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.1295** (0.0556) 
0.4233*** 
(0.1122) 
0.1286 
(0.1139) 
Math Index Lag 0.0135 (0.0108) 
-0.010 
(0.0169) 
0.0617** 
(0.0279) 
Appalachia 3.968*** (1.383) 
4.753*** 
(1.913) 
1.681 
(1.449) 
N  
R-Squared 
937  
0.0569 
633  
0.1243 
735  
0.1153 
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Table B.3: Predicted Class Size (School Fixed Effects, z-scores) 
*indicates 0.10 level of significance, **indicates 0.05 level of significance, *** indicates 0.01 level of significance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficients  
(robust std. errors) 
Coefficients  
(robust std. errors) 
Coefficients  
(robust std. errors) 
Independent Variables Grade 5 Grade 8 Grade 11 
Teacher Characteristics    
Past Effectiveness 0.6631*** (0.2430) 
0.8463** 
(0.2812) 
1.375 
(0.8192) 
Experience  -0.0379 (0.0246) 
0.0161 
(0.0403) 
-0.0530 
(0.0356) 
Highest Degree Obtained -0.0981 (0.1709) 
0.5498** 
(0.2515) 
0.4738 
(0.4591) 
Classroom Characteristics 
 
  
Math rank lag -0.8971 (0.5872) 
0.9321 
(0.8621) 
0.3215 
(0.7539) 
Science rank lag 0.2045 (0.3854) 
-0.3858 
(0.7384) 
-0.0227 
(0.6493) 
Reading rank lag -0.1853 (0.3549) 
-1.217* 
(0.6899) 
-0.3962 
(0.3791) 
Free and Reduced Price 
(FRP)Lunch  
-2.297 
(2.851) 
-8.382 
(5.211) 
-5.485* 
(3.128) 
Asian -0.1324 (5.295) 
21.917 
(25.157) 
-3.811 
(9.625) 
Black 4.701* (2.819) 
3.902 
(7.309) 
-2.973 
(4.129) 
Hispanic -4.206 (4.578) 
7.712 
(12.397) 
38.574* 
(22.256) 
Native American 6.174 (24.366) 
310.094*** 
(103.396) 
150.473* 
(72.841) 
Other -2.871 (8.667) 
3.755 
(14.598) 
15.085 
(21.399) 
School Characteristics 
 
  
Expenditure per student -0.0005*** (0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0006) 
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.1501 (0.0996) 
-0.1034 
(0.1339) 
-0.0253 
(0.1717) 
Math Index Lag 0.0406** (0.0197) 
-0.0387* 
(0.0218) 
-0.0224 
(0.0482) 
N 
R-Squared 
937 
0.0678 
633  
0.1104 
735  
0.0982 
Fraction of Variance 0.734 0.434 0.187 
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Appendix C: Kentucky Budget Codes1 
Fund 
Category Description 
1 General Fund 
2 Special Revenue Fund 
310 Capital Outlay Fund 
360 Construction Fund 
51 Food Service Fund 
7XXX Trust and Agency Funds 
 
Unit 
000 District Wide 
001 Central Office 
002-899 School Numbers 
 
Function 
1XXX Instruction 
21XX Student Support 
22XX Instructional Support 
23XX District Admin 
24XX School Admin 
25XX Business Support 
26XX Plant Operation 
27XX Student Transportation 
3XXX Non-Instructional 
4XXX Facilities Acquisition 
5XXX Other 
  
Program 
1XX Regular Programs 
2XX Special Programs 
3XX Vocational Programs 
4XX Other Instructional Programs 
  
Expenditure Object 
01XX Salaries/Personnel Services 
02XX Employee Benefits 
03XX Professional/Technical Serv 
04XX Property Services 
05XX Other Services 
06XX Supplies and Materials 
07XX Property 
08XX Other Expenditures 
09XX Other Uses of Funds 
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Appendix C cont. 
  
Revenue Objects 
0999 Balance Carry Forward 
1XXX Revenue from Local Sources 
3XXX Revenue from State Sources 
4XXX Revenue from Federal Sources 
5XXX Other Receipts 
  
Balance Sheet Objects 
6XXX Assets 
7XXX Liabilities 
8XXX Fund Balances 
1 - Provided to present an idea of the data available and is not a comprehensive 
list 
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